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Abstract
The human visual system solves an amazing range of problems in the course of everyday
activities. Without conscious effort, the human visual system finds a place on the table to
put down a cup, selects the shortest checkout queue in a grocery store, looks for moving
vehicles before we cross a road, and checks to see if the stoplight has turned green.
Inspired by the human visual system, I have developed a model of vision, with special
emphasis on visual attention. In this thesis, I explain that model and exhibit programs
based on that model that:
1. Extract a wide variety of spatial relations on demand.
2. Learn visuospatial patterns of activity from experience.
For example, one program determines what object a human is pointing to. Another learns
a particular pattern of visual activity evoked whenever an object falls off a table.
The program that extracts spatial relations on demand uses sequences of primitive oper-
ations called visual routines. The primitive operations in the visual routines fall into one
of three families: operations for moving the focus of attention; operations for establishing
certain properties at the focus of attention; and operations for selecting locations. The three
families of primitive operations constitute a powerful language of attention. That language
supports the construction of visual routines for a wide variety of visuospatial tasks.
The program that learns visuospatial patterns of activity rests on the idea that visual
routines can be viewed as repeating patterns of attentional state. I show how my language
of attention enables learning by supporting the extraction, from experience, of such patterns
of repeating attentional state.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter Outline
This thesis is the result of a desire to build a robot with human-like abilities.
This chapter
* Discusses some of the approaches to building a human-like robot.
* Outlines some promising new directions.
* Describes the two problems that this thesis deals with.
* Summarizes the contributions of the thesis.
* Gives a brief outline of the thesis.
1.1 Building a humanoid robot
Building a robot with human like capabilities has been one of the holy grails of Artificial
Intelligence. After more than 40 years of trying to do this we are still far from the goal.
During this period, the two main approaches that have dominated our efforts to build
intelligent machines are the "Symbol Systems" and "Behavior based" approaches. A brief
review of the contributions of these approaches will help us formulate some key questions
that still remain to be answered.
1.2 The Symbol System Approach
The "Symbol Systems Approach" of classical Artificial Intelligence is based on the sepa-
ration of reasoning from perception and action. It assumes that knowledge and the ma-
nipulation of knowledge, can and should be separated from the particular details of the
physical body (the sensors and effectors). The framework in which traditional Artificial
Intelligence works is that perception delivers a symbolic' description of the world in terms
of a fixed set of predicates like ON(A, B), or LIKES(X, Y). The "reasoning module" usually
contains hand-crafted knowledge about the world expressed in some knowledge represen-
tation language (e.g. if-then rules, frames, scripts, or declarative statements in some form
of mathematical logic). This knowledge, and the world description, are used by a problem
solving mechanism to achieve some goal. The solution is passed to an execution module
that performs actual actions in the world to achieve the goal. This is the basic framework.
This approach to achieving cognition arose from a conjunction of two factors - a somewhat
restricted view of human intelligence, and a bias of what the available technology (digital
computers and programming languages like LISP) was good at doing - symbol manipulation.
The influence of our models of computers on our models of thought, or how the problem
was defined to fit the tools, is well described by Brooks[8]. So we will briefly consider the
other major influence, namely what the early researchers wanted when they said "human
like intelligence". Human intelligence was characterized by the ability to solve certain kinds
of "difficult problems" - like solving a problem in formal logic [37], proving mathematical
theorems, discovering scientific laws from data [36], and multicolumn subtraction [49]. The
choice of these problems as representative of human cognition is interesting - it reflects a folk
view of intelligence, most of humanity hardly ever engages in these tasks and the few who do
are usually the ones regarded as "intelligent", hence (the reasoning went) investigate these
"high order intellectual processes" and you have the key to human intelligence. The tool
for investigating these "high order intellectual processes" was introspection. For example a
student would be given a problem in formal logic and asked to speak his/her thoughts aloud
while constructing the proof. These verbalizations would be recorded and then analyzed for
clues about the problem solving process [37]. After analyzing the problem solving process
in the other problems too, it was found that if you strip away the particulars of the problem
then you could explain problem solving in these limited class of problems as search in some
space of symbols. This fact in conjunction with the bias of the available technology led
to the introduction of "symbol manipulation" into a definition of intelligence. A physical
symbol system was defined as a bunch of symbol structures (tokens, expressions) and some
processes to create and modify the structures. The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis
states that a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general
intelligent action [38]. The main problems with the traditional approach are:
* Building representations for particular tasks instead of representations that could sup-
port a variety of tasks. Consequently we end up with a collection of separate programs
that play chess, prove theorems, or do medical diagnosis. There is nothing wrong with
this if our intention is to build tools that can assist humans, however we should not
fool ourselves into thinking that the collection of these programs says anything about
cognition.
* It evades knowledge acquisition. It does not address the basic issue of how the knowl-
edge (e.g. rules of chess, or behavior of liquids) is acquired in the first place. The
practice of isolating domains and hand-coding facts about them is clearly evading
the issue and one of the factors responsible for the performance of these systems not
scaling.
SThere are many different notions of "symbol". In this particular case "symbol" is used in a very narrow
sense similar to the tokens and expressions of LISP.
* The abuse of Abstraction. Brooks [9] points out that coming up with descriptions like
ON(A, B) from a scene (both the choice of that particular feature, and the detection
of that feature) is the essence of intelligence and the hard part of the problem. He
says
Under the current scheme the abstraction is done by the researchers leaving
little for the AI programs to do but search.
* Weak Inference. In spite of the emphasis on problem solving, the systems exhibited
very weak inference capabilities, they could hardly infer anything beyond what they
were told. For example, if the system is trying to build a tower of blocks by putting
B on C (described as ON(B,C)), and then A on B (described as ON(A,B)), and each
block happens to be skewed a little to the right because of some error in positioning.
The tower collapses and the description of the history (ON(A,B), ON(B,C)) contains
no information about what went wrong. The description is in fact identical to de-
scriptions of towers that did not collapse. The tendency of the knowledge engineer is
to make the symbolic primitives more elaborate; by introducing degrees of ON-ness
in the description, for example. This is just a temporary fix, and does not address
the source of the problem. The weak inference stems from two sources. The first
source of weak inference is that only one kind of representation is being used - the
symbolic representation used in the previous example can only make certain types
of information explicit (a qualitative representation of ON-ness) and will break when
you attempt to use it for tasks for which it it is not suited. The second source of
weak inference is the artificial separation of perception from reasoning. Prematurely
throwing away the perceptual representation of the image without knowing what's
important in it for some task is a mistake. Certain kinds of reasoning (about why
the tower collapsed) may be best performed using "perceptual" representations and
processes.
* All Knowledge may not have to be represented explicitly. A robot can behave in a
manner such that a human might attribute some knowledge and goals to it, but that
doesn't mean that the robot should be built with an explicit representation of that
knowledge or goals.
1.3 The Behavior Based Approach
The more recent approach to building intelligent systems is the behavior based approach
pioneered by Brooks [9, 8, 7] as a reaction to the problems of the Symbol Systems Ap-
proach. The main motivation of the behavior based approach is that the ability to perceive
and act evolved long before, and took much longer to evolve, than the abilities of playing
chess, or proving theorems. Hence it is worthwhile to investigate simple perception action
loops because they might give you some insight into more complicated forms of intelligent
behavior.
In the behavior based approach one attempts to build robots that perform simple tasks in
complex environments. The hope is that it is easier to start with a complex environment
and some simple tasks, and then gradually start increasing the complexity of the task,
rather than the other way around. The chief insights of behavior based A.I are:
* Embodiment and Situatedness - Investigate intelligence by working in the real world
with real physical robots that directly sense the world. This prevents you from deal-
ing with artifactual problems in simulated environments, and also lets you exploit
constraints in the real world.
* Exploiting the complexity of the environment - There is a way to design robots that
can lead to complex behavior with non-centralized representations of the world. The
complexity of the behavior is a product of the dynamics of the interaction of the
robot with a complex environment rather than some complicated internal represen-
tation of the world. The trick to designing robots that exploit the complexity of the
environment is by designing a collection of behaviors that interact with each other via
the environment. The behaviors themselves are very simple independent perception
action loops tightly coupled to the environment.
* The world is it's own best model - The world is sensed continuously instead of main-
taining and updating some complicated internal model.
With these insights the behavior based approach has been successful in developing a sub-
sumption architecture methodology for incrementally building collections of behaviors.
However, there is a still a large gap between the cognitive abilities of the most compli-
cated behavior based systems to-date and the human like robots that we would like to
build. To be fair, it has never been claimed that the principles of subsumption architec-
ture were alone sufficient either as an explanatory device, or as a constructive recipe for
human-like intelligence. However, the question must be asked if a collection of hundreds of
human-like behaviors, like looking preferentially at human faces, imitating gestures, e.t.c
bring us any closer to understanding or building human-like intelligence. This brings us to
the key question of what we want when we say "human-like intelligence"?
1.4 What exactly do we want?
What is it about the human brain that makes it so unique in the animal kingdom? How
did human intelligence evolve? Can we find a way to understand how the differences in
brains and bodies between species corresponds to the different cognitive landscapes that
they inhabit? For instance, why is it that even a "genius" fly or frog could never be able
to contemplate the solar system or plan for next week? In the context of the evolution of
cognition these questions strike at the core of what it is to be human.
In the remainder of this section I will take a particular position on the question of what
distinguishes human cognition. Doing so will help us pose some questions which must be
answered if we are to build a humanoid robot. This thesis itself is a first step towards
answering these questions.
1.5 A platform that supports rich representation and infer-
ence
The most striking aspect of human intelligence is the astonishingly broad range of things
that we can represent and infer. For example we can have concepts like "solar system",
or understand how a bicycle pump works, or prove a theorem in mathematics. One truly
appreciates how peculiar it is that we can do these things when one observes that the rep-
resentational capabilities of most animals are very tightly coupled to the environmental
niche in which they evolved. Homo Sapiens on the other hand can represent things like
"atom" or "striped elephant" - things that it may never have perceived, or may not even
exist. The key point to remember is that it is not our questionable expertise at any one of
the tasks mentioned above, but that we can do them at all and that we can do so many of
them that characterizes human intelligence. Therefore, a fundamental question in Artificial
Intelligence which we must answer if we are to build robots with human like intelligence
is what is the source of this representational power? How can we engineer powerful rep-
resentational and inference capabilities in a robot? It cannot be stressed enough that the
idea is not to build specialized representations for individual task domains, but rather to
build a representational platform that will allow the robot to learn to play chess, or answer
a question about how toasters work without a human having to handcode any representa-
tions particular to game playing or qualitative physics. This, then is what I want when I
say "human like intelligence".
1.6 Origins of representational power
An important clue to the origin of representational and inference capabilities in humans
lies in our evolutionary history. It seems unlikely that in the course of evolution we sud-
denly developed specialized neural substrates devoted to playing chess, or doing arithmetic.
From an evolutionary standpoint it seems much more likely that such abilities are purely
accidental byproducts of more basic previously evolved capabilities like representing space,
manipulating objects, natural language syntax, and a representation of social relations [42],
[5] - representations and processes that evolved as a response to the pressures of being em-
bodied, and being in the company of other similarly embodied humans. The implication
of this simple hypothesis is that you may be solving an integral for example2 , by using
visuospatial operations on spatial representations of some symbols, and imputing syntactic
categories and anthropomorphic roles to the components of the expression. Whether you
believe this particular example or not is not important. The point is that some such expla-
nation of our abstract cognitive abilities in terms of representations and processes meant
for more mundane activities must exist. Clearly, ants, frogs, and monkeys have visual, mo-
tor, and communication systems too. Yet we know that even the smartest of them cannot
even begin to grasp the concept of an atom - a concept that is well within the reach of an
adult human. We need a deep understanding of what is special about our representational
systems and their interactions that lets us do things that other species cannot.
If we somehow understood what it is about embodied representations and pro-
cesses and their interactions that gives rise to the "accidental" byproducts of
being able to do calculus or think about atoms, then we would be well on our
way to understanding the source of human cognition.
In order to gain such an understanding, we need to
21 choose this example because doing mathematics is considered to be one of the abstract cognitive feats
of the human brain.
1. Pick a small set of representations and processes that that originally evolved to facili-
tate certain tasks like navigating through space, or manipulating objects, or for social
interaction.
2. Explain what it is about each of them that makes it flexible enough to be re-used in
novel ways.
3. Explain how interactions between different representations (e.g. when a visuospatial
pattern of activity gets re-expressed in a syntactic representation as an atomic symbol)
creates a whole new level of complexity that we label as "higher-level" cognition.
I believe that pursuing such a research program will be very rewarding in our efforts to
understand natural intelligence, as well as in building human-like intelligence. As a first
step, in this thesis I look at some visuospatial representations and processes from the point
of view of the program described above.
1.7 Visuospatial underpinnings of human cognition
What is vision for? The kinds of tasks that leap to mind are recognizing people, places,
locating objects, deciding where to put down your coffee cup, driving, ... etc. So many
everyday tasks involve vision that it is harder to find tasks for which one does not need
any vision. Recognizing objects, and directing action are important functions of vision
no doubt, however, visual processes may also be play an important part in understanding
language, understanding how a device works, doing arithmetic, or planning a trip. In other
words visual processes may be deeply intertwined with the kinds of things that we would
characterize as "high-level" cognition.
The next natural question is how? What are the common underlying representations/processes
in our visual system that support both the mundane tasks of getting about the environment,
as well as the more "abstract" tasks like the ones mentioned above? The following three
processes are likely candidates:
1. Detecting spatio-temporal regularities: The regularities or patterns that we see in the
spatio-temporal behavior of objects form our model of the physical world. A vast
repository of such patterns constitutes what we call common-sense knowledge about
space. These patterns also form the metaphors into which we fit future experience
(Johnson[23]). Therefore, it is important to have mechanisms that detect spatio-
temporal regularities.
2. Extracting spatial relations on demand: Visual processes that evolved to direct action
should not be tied to extracting only particular features of the environment. While
they should be capable of serving the visual needs of various behaviors such as tracking,
or grasping, they should not be limited to only extracting the visual features required
by those behaviors. The visual machinery needs to be more powerful, and capable
of extracting a potentially unbounded number of visual features that go well beyond
what the hardwired behaviors require. The spatial analysis machinery in humans
has this kind of flexibility, thereby lending itself for use not only on a variety of real
world spatial problems (e.g. does the equator pass through Zaire on a map? or what
is the human pointing to?), but also synthesized spatial descriptions (e.g. a spatial
representation of your schedule for the day).
3. Synthesizing spatial descriptions on demand: This capability allows the application
of the visual problem solving machinery to a hypothetical situation formed from the
precedents and defaults that have been learned.
The following example illustrates how these three capabilities might work together. When
given the problem:
John is taller than Mary, and Mary taller than Susan. Is John taller
than Susan?
A child might synthesize a visual description of John, Susan, and Mary standing next to
each other, and then use her learned regularity of what it means for one object to be taller
than the next to drive a visual routine - a specific sequence of operations that are applied
to the image to extract the spatial relations of interest.
It is my view that the three capabilities of learning spatial regularities from experience,
extracting spatial relations on demand, and synthesizing spatial descriptions, work together
to create a very powerful and flexible mechanism that plays a major role in representation
and inference in humans.
1.8 Two Problems
The goal of this thesis is to propose and demonstrate mechanisms for the first two problems
mentioned in the previous section - extracting spatial relations on demand and learning
spatial regularities from experience.
The first problem that I deal with is to find a spatial analysis mechanism that is robust and
versatile enough to handle a wide variety of spatial tasks, Figure 1-1(a) shows a schematic.
The second problem is to suggest a visuospatial representation for concepts like "fall" or
"more", and show how such representations might be learned from experience. Figure 1-
1(b) shows a schematic. The representation of these spatial concepts will in fact drive the
spatial analysis machinery that sought as part of the first problem.
1.9 Contributions of the thesis towards Problem #1
The main contributions of this thesis towards finding a robust spatial analysis machinery
that can solve a wide variety of spatial problems, are as follows:
1. A Language of Attention. The machinery for extracting spatial relations and the
mechanisms of visual attention are closely linked. I present a specific proposal for
a spatial analysis architecture, the core of which is a new language of attention.
Figure 1-2 shows a schematic. All procedures for extracting spatial relations are
constructed by picking primitive operations from the three classes of operations. A
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Figure 1-3: Expectations about an object passing behind an occluder may be in terms of
changes of attentional state
typical procedure (called a visual routine) involves moving the focus of attention to
a location, establishing certain properties and performing some operations at that
location, selecting location(s) based on the properties just established, moving the
focus of attention to one of those locations, and starting the cycle all over again.
2. Attention is more than selection. The proposed architecture extends and enriches prior
models of Attention. The function of visual attention has traditionally been seen as
"Selection", where one region is selected from many. In the proposed architecture (as
shown in Figure 1-2), Selection is just one of the classes of operations, and is effective
in spatial problem solving only in conjunction with the other classes.
3. A versatile architecture for real-images. As far as I are aware this is the first attempt
to construct an architecture for real images with the explicit goal of being able to
handle a very wide variety of spatial problems.
1.10 Contributions of the thesis towards Problem #2
The main contributions of this thesis towards finding a perceptual representation for con-
cepts like "fall", and learning such representations is as follows:
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Figure 1-4: Regularities in the world and attentional biases repeatedly drive the atten-
tional state through patterns. High frequency patterns become expectations. Expectations
generate visual routines to check for the predicted part of the pattern.
1. Patterns in Attentional State I make a specific proposal for the perceptual represen-
tation underlying many visuospatial concepts, namely that it is in changes of "At-
tentional State". While Niyogi[39] has recently made a similar proposal, and demon-
strated it in a simulated world of simple geometric shapes, I present a model for
real-world images, and also show how recurring patterns in attentional state may be
learned. Figure 1-4 shows a schematic. Structure in the world and biases in attention
lead to certain repeating trajectories in attentional state space. These patterns can
be learned and constitute the perceptual representation for the event (e.g. an object
falling), and also act as the expectation for future events.
2. A novel parsimonious view of Cognitive Development. Figure 1-3 shows a sequence
where a ball passes behind an occluder and emerges on the other side. It has been
shown by Spelke[52] and Baillergeon[3] that children have strong expectations for such
events by the age of 4 months, and that a violation of these expectations (for instance
if the ball were to emerge from behind another occluder which is some distance away)
causes surprise. The question of interest here is what is the regularity that the child
has learned and how is this represented? Spelke and Baillergeon's explanations rely on
something called "object-concepts" and knowledge of some sort of "intuitive physics".
I propose a much simpler explanation in terms of changes of attentional state, and
show how such expectations can be learned.
3. A promising candidate for perceptual grounding. The question of "perceptual ground-
ing", i.e. if there is some perceptual representation that concepts like "fall", or "more"
bottom out in, has always been of great interest in Artificial Intelligence. The "pat-
terns of attentional state" proposal made in this thesis is a concrete candidate for
such a representation. I think that "patterns in attentional state" constitute a good
representation because they are expressed in terms of the "language of attention", the
same language that is used to check for these events in a top-down manner. In other
words the representation of the regularity is in a form that makes it easy to check for
it in the future.
1.11 Outline of the Thesis
In Chapter 2 I introduce the problem of extracting spatial relations on demand. I describe
Ullman's [58] visual routines proposal, and review subsequent efforts to implement this
proposal in various domains. I concentrate on a system by Mahoney[29] for extracting
spatial relations from binary images. While static binary images are a very different domain
from the dynamic gray-scale/color images of real scenes, the binary image domain will serve
to illustrate the compositional feature of my solution for real-world images.
In Chapter 3 I present a novel model of visual attention for generating visual routines. Visual
routines are sequences of operations for extracting spatial relations, or more generally (as
we shall see) patterns of activity in attentional state. This is the core chapter that lays out
the families of spatial representations and operations used by my system. I compare my
model of visual attention to models of visual attention in psychophysics, neuroscience, and
machine vision.
In Chapter 4 I present a scheme for learning visual routines from experience. Whereas in
Chapter 3 the focus is on the primitive operations of visual routines and how they can be
strung together to extract different spatial relations, the focus in Chapter 4 is on how visual
routines automatically come about from experience.
1.12 Summary
The long-term motivation is to build human-like cognition. Abstract cognitive feats may be
accidental by-products of previously evolved representations and processes that evolved to
support more mundane activities. A central challenge therefore, is to understand/model/dissect
these representations to understand what makes them versatile and re-usable. I propose
that the combination of 3 visuospatial mechanisms makes a very powerful and flexible sys-
tem for the representation of "common-sense" spatial concepts, and spatial inference. In
this thesis I will propose models for two of these mechanisms: extracting spatial relations
on demand, and learning "common-sense" spatial regularities from experience.
Chapter
Visuospatial problem solving
Chapter Outline
In this chapter introduces the problem of extracting spatial relations on
demand. I describe Ullman's [58] visual routines proposal, and review sub-
sequent efforts to implement this proposal in various domains. concentrate
on a system by Mahoney[29] for extracting spatial relations from binary
images. While static binary images are a very different domain from the dy-
namic gray-scale/color images of real scenes, the binary image domain will
serve to illustrate two important features:
* The power of composing visual routines by repeatedly choosing prim-
itives from a small set of operations.
* The fact that visual routines work by repeatedly setting up successive
frames of reference.
These two features will carry over to my visual routine architecture for real-
images described in Chapter 3.
2.1 The need for a flexible spatial analysis mechanism
The human visual system is remarkably adept at solving spatial problems that arise in
the course of everyday activity. Whether it is finding place on the table to put down a
cup, or selecting the shortest checkout queue in a grocery store, visuospatial problems are
constantly being solved in order to guide our next action. Figure 2-1 shows a small sample
of problems that our visual system may be presented with during the course of a day. In
Figure 2-1(a) one must determine the locations of the humans and the table and check for a
particular spatial relationship between them. In Figure 2-1(f) segmenting the wedges is the
hard part of the problem, because there is no clear demarcation between them. In Figure
2-1(h) one has to not only locate the plates and cups, but also keep track of which one goes
with which, based on spatial proximity. In Figure 2-1(b) one has to somehow count only
the regions that the equator passes through, and the counting process has to keep track of
the regions already counted.
Even though the problems may look very different the common thread running through
all of them is that one must be able to extract some regions in the image, and establish
certain spatial properties between them. The selection of the regions themselves may be
because of their spatial relationship with respect to other regions (e.g. when you want to
find some chalk, you may look in the vicinity of a blackboard which is easier to find). In all
of these examples "Object recognition" is not the crux of the problem, any hard-to-recognize
object in these pictures can always be replaced by a blob without changing the essence of
the problem. It is the establishment of spatial relations that is the focus here. There is
widely cited evidence from Ungerleider and Mishkin [33] about two distinct pathways in the
primate visual cortex - one devoted to object identity, and the other to object location, and
spatial relations. The majority of the literature in machine-vision has been skewed towards
object recognition with relatively little attention to the spatial mechanisms.
What kinds of visual mechanisms in humans make it possible to handle the spatial tasks in
Figure 2-1 ? Ideally one would like to take a very simple problem (e.g which of two blobs is
larger) and be able to trace the mechanisms all the way from early visual representations in
V1, through the spatial selection mechanisms in V4, spatial transformations in the parietal
cortex, behavioral short term memory in the prefrontal lobe, to the final motor intention of
pointing to the bigger blob 1. Unfortunately, we do not know about the mechanisms at this
level of detail. One of the problems that many different areas in the brain are involved in
even a "simple" visuospatial task, and multicellular recording techniques are still in their
infancy. In 1967 Yarbus [22] recorded the eye-movements of subjects after showing them
images like the one in Figure 2-2 and presenting them with a specific question about the
image. The sequence of foveations reveal several interesting features like the tendency to
return repeatedly to a prior foveation point, however they shed no light on the kinds of
computations performed at a particular point of foveation, or the kind of state maintained
across foveations.
Presently we do not have a reasonable computational model for visuospatial problem solving,
but it is imperative to come up with one because these tasks are ubiquitous in everyday
life, these are typical of the variety of tasks that we would expect a humanoid robot visual
system to deal with from moment to moment and use the results to guide its actions.
This chapter and the next one deal with the problem of finding spatial analysis machinery
that can account for this competence, i.e the ability to extract different kinds of spatial
relations on demand.
Before exploring the problem in more detail we need to lay some issues to rest.
2.1.1 Can't we simply build a special purpose solution for each task?
It is certainly possible - albeit after some work - to come up with algorithms for each
individual task. In fact, if one is building a well defined application where a small fixed set
of spatial tasks is required, and known in advance, it is practical to handcode individual
solutions for each task. However, the main goal of this thesis is to make progress on the
1This is of course a crude caricature of one pathway, there are doubtlessly other forward and back-
projection pathways involved
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Figure 2-2: Yarbus [22] showed subjects a painting, asked them various questions about it,
and recorded their eye-movements
issue of building a visual system for a humanoid robot or intelligent room that like the
human visual system can handle an open-ended set of spatial problems. In other words, the
goal is to find a common framework that solves all these problems as they arise. It is this
insistence on an open-ended system that makes the problem hard.
2.1.2 Why should we insist on a common framework?
There are two good reasons why we should:
1. Scalability: A humanoid robot or intelligent room may have to deal with thousands
of spatial problems in the course of a day. Writing a different program for each one is
just not practical.
2. Learning: If we want to learn to detect different spatial events and relations, having
a common vocabulary to express the commonalities is essential.
2.2 The framework of a solution: Ullman's visual routines
Shimon Ullman [58] initially proposed the problem of finding a versatile spatial analysis
mechanism and also described the framework of a solution. The essence of his solution
is that there exists a set of elementary operations that when combined in different ways
produce different visual routines for doing various spatial tasks. The elementary operations
therefore form a kind of basis set for visual routines.
Ullman suggests that visual processing is divided into two stages. The bottom-up, spatially
uniform, viewer-centered computation of the base representation (like the 2 1/2 D sketch)
followed by the extraction of abstract spatial properties by visual routines. Visual routines
define objects and parts, their shapes and spatial relations. The formation and application
of visual routines is not determined by visual input alone but also by the specific task at
hand. The elementary operations are not all of the same type, some of them operate in
parallel across the entire image, others can be applied only at a single location at a time.
It is suggested that these characteristics of the operators reflect constraints inherent to the
computation they perform, not because of a shortage of resources. The structures computed
as a result of the application of various visual routines are incrementally pieced together
so that subsequent processing of the same image can benefit from the intermediate results
of previous computations. For example when asked to count the number of red objects in
a scene, the intermediate result of the locations of the red objects is maintained to help
answer a later question about the biggest red object.
Ullman suggests the following as plausible elementary operations:
1. Shift of Processing focus: A process that controls where an operation is applied.
2. Indexing: Locations that are the odd-man-out in the base representation (e.g an island
of blue in a sea of red), attract the processing focus directly. They are called indexable
locations and serve as starting points for further processing.
3. Bounded activation or Coloring: The spreading of activation in the base representation
from a location or locations. The activation is stopped by boundaries in the base
representation.
4. Boundary Tracing: Moving the processing focus along one or more contours.
5. Marking: Remembering a particular location so that processing can ignore it or return
to it in the future.
2.2.1 Key issues in making the proposal work
Composing a basis set of elemental spatial operations to solve spatial tasks is an attractive
idea. Clearly this kind of explanation is far more plausible than having specialized feature
detectors like "the smallest object inside the big circle". However in order to flesh out the
details of the visual routines proposal one has to deal with two key issues:
1. Choice of a set of primitives: What is a good set of elementary operations?
2. Composition: Given a set of primitives how do they get strung together to perform
some spatial task? Is there a need for an explicit sequencer?
In the remainder of this chapter I will review some work on the topic of visual routines
by Horswill, Chapman, and Mahoney & Rao. At the end of the chapter we will be in a
position to assess their contributions in the light of the issues mentioned above, and see
what are the open problems in coming up with a computational model for visuospatial
problem solving. The next two chapters, which form the core of the thesis, directly address
these open questions.
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Figure 2-3: The attention system and enumeration oracle
2.3 Jeeves - A VRP for a blocks world domain
"Jeeves" is a Visual Routine Processor constructed by Ian Horswill [21] for performing
"visual search" to answer simple conjunctive queries in a blocks-like world. In a typical
instance the system examines a scene of colored blocks and finds a block "X" that satisfies
a query like: green(X) A vertical(X) A on(X, Y) where Y is some other block. The system
also computes some simple spatial relations like "On".
2.3.1 An overview of Jeeves
Figure 2-3 shows a schematic of the architecture of the system. The early-level vision
consists of a set of color maps (R,G,B, R/I, G/I, B/I), intensity, and Laplacian edges. A
preattentive segmentation stage carves the scene into regions of uniform color. A set of task-
specific pixel-by-pixel control weights is used to compute a saliency map. The "attention"
uses the saliency map to modulate the segmentation map, and selects the region with the
highest integral of salience. The bounding box, centroid, and average low-level map values
of the winning region are computed. Two important pieces of attentional state are a set of
markers which hold the centroids of some regions, and the "Return Inhibition Map" which
is a retinotopic map that masks out regions that should not be selected.
Given a query like green(X) A vertical(X) A on(X, Y) The expression is preprocessed to
indicate the variables that need to be enumerated and fed to an "enumeration & backtrack-
ing" automaton. The control logic of the automaton causes it to backup over the literals
if a particular variable binding fails. The reader is referred to [21] for the details. The
important points to note are that the logic variables are implemented by markers (which
are essentially pointers to regions in the image), and that backtracking state (values of a
variable that have already been tried) are maintained by the return inhibition map. After
enumerating the various variable bindings, the solution to the query - if one exists - is left
as a set of markers (regions) that satisfy the query.
Low level maps
2.3.2 A critique of Jeeves
The main focus of the Jeeves architecture is the control mechanism for variable enumer-
ation and backtracking during visual search for regions that satisfy a certain conjunction
of attributes. My main criticism of Jeeves as a viable architecture for a visual routine
processor is that the control architecture is not the hard part of most real-world spatial prob-
lems. To illustrate this point consider the problem in Figure 2-1(e) of determining what
the human is pointing at This problem would have to be presented to Jeeves as the query
Pointing(Y, X) A Human(Y). Jeeves would then try to enumerate over different regions in
the image to find the ones that satisfy the expression, the implicit assumption here is that
somehow there exist "procedures" for determining the predicates "Pointing()", and "Hu-
man()". But coming up with visual operations for determining the truth of these predicates
is the essence, and the hard part of the visual routines problem! The Jeeves architecture
has little to say about this matter because it's focus is on the enumeration of arguments of
the predicates, and not as much on the robustness/versatility of the mechanisms for deter-
mining the truth of the predicates. Finally, let us briefly focus on the spatial mechanism
that Jeeves does use for determining the truth of predicates like On(X, Y). Jeeves drops a
ray downward from the marker for region X and checks to see it crosses a region Y, directly
below. How versatile are such ray tracing methods for establishing different kinds of spatial
relations? (Chapman [10] too heavily relies on ray tracing methods to establish spatial
relations). The answer is that they are certainly useful for establishing a coarse spatial
relationship between regions, but they are not sufficient for capturing somewhat finer local
spatial relationships. For instance in Figure 2-1(c) drawing a ray between the centroids of
the box and the rod is not going to help answer the question.
2.4 Sonja - A concrete-situated context for the application
of visual routines
David Chapman's "Sonja" [10] is a system that plays the video game Amazon. In this game
the player controls the actions of a video icon that has to battle ghosts and demons while
trying to pick up various objects in its two dimensional world.
2.4.1 An overview of Sonja
The machine's inputs are a symbolic abstraction of a 2D world and occasional instructions
from a human. The two major components of the system are a set of peripheral visual
operators and a central system that controls application of the operators. At any given
instant the peripheral operators compute various geometrical properties of the world. Figure
2-4 shows the inputs and outputs to a visual operator in Sonja. The central system specifies
some of the operands of the visual operator and also a control signal that tells the operator
to execute or not. The intermediate state that is referenced and updated by the operator
is accessible to all the operators.
The central system consists of units called proposers and arbiters. Each proposer proposes
the application of a particular visual operator with certain parameters. Each proposer has a
condition under which its proposal is valid. There may be different proposers with different
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Figure 2-4: A visual operator from Sonja
suggested parameter settings for the same visual operator. If the conditions of all these
proposers happen to be true then an arbiter implements some fixed override scheme on the
various proposals to select one of them (a set of operands) for the visual operator. The
central system is therefore a large unmodular net of proposers and arbiters whose input
is from the visual operators and whose output at a particular time is the application of a
visual operator with some set of arguments.
Figure 2-5 shows the interaction between the world, the visual operators, and the central
system during the operation of Sonja. The x-axis multiplexes time and space. The trape-
zoids represent the entire central system. Only the operator that is finally chosen and its
inputs and outputs is shown in the figure. The triangles represent delay elements that store
information within the central system between clock ticks. The key point made here by
Chapman is that Visual Routines are interactional patterns, NOT programs. In the figure
some aspect of the world gets noticed by the bottom up visual operator OP26 which reports
it to the central system. Based on this new development and the past history the central
system directs another visual operator OP37 to report on some aspect of the scene. The
information from OP37 and past history is used to take some action (OP99) which affects
the world, and simultaneously give some instructions to OP37. Thus, Chapman points out
the notion of a visual routine is an abstraction that an observer can make while looking
at the interaction. In other words, nowhere in the central system is there a specification
that the sequence OP26 - OP37 - OP99 - OP37 should be applied under some conditions,
nor is it the case that some single unit planned this sequence of application of operators.
This pattern of interaction just happened to dynamically arise given the states of the central
system and the states of the world.
2.4.2 A critique of Sonja
The main purpose of Sonja is to demonstrate various aspects of the concrete-situated ap-
proach (e.g, situatedness, routine activity, dynamics of interaction) in a simple simulated
world. Visual routines per-se are not the focus of the work, so it is not surprising that the
mechanisms for extract spatial relations in Sonja do not scale to real-world spatial problems.
The set of spatial relations between markers computed by the peripheral operators are not
rich enough to handle many of the problems in Figure 2-1 for instance.
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Figure 2-5: Visual routines are interactions, not programs.
However, Chapman makes two important contributions to the issue of composition of visual
routines.
1. He emphasizes that there might be no central box that sequences or plans visual
routines, but that the sequence of applications of various operators emerge from the
interaction of the central system with the world. The very same observation was made
by Brooks [6] in his criticism of traditional views about Planning. The behavior based
approach that he used to build insect like robots does not have central representations
of plans. Instead, it has a collection of mostly independent perception-action loops
that are tightly coupled to the environment. The similarity between Chapman's in-
sight about visual routines and Brooks's insight about planning can be seen clearly
if we view each of the peripheral operators as a behavior and flatten out the central
system as the various excitations and inhibitions between behaviors.
2. Chapman stresses the "routine" aspect of visual routines. Namely, the dynamics of
the interaction between an agent and the environment give rise to certain routine
patterns the agent falls into.
Finally I review a visual routine language developed by James Mahoney [29] for extracting
spatial relations from Binary Images, and also some specific examples of visual routines
written in this language implemented by this author.
2.5 The RG system: Visual Routines for Binary Images
The "Reverse Graphics" system developed by Jim Mahoney is a versatile set of spatial
analysis primitives which can be combined together in different ways to implement a host
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of applications. Figure 2-6 shows some of the applications implemented by Rao using a
common set of primitives.
In Figure 2-6(a) the input to the system is a crude hand-drawn sketch of a pie-chart.
The system analyzes the sketch to extract the relative sizes of the wedges and renders an
equivalent pie-chart. Note that the system is not simply a rendering program that "cleans
up" edges. It is extracting the wedges from the sketch in spite of the fact that there is no
clean demarcation between the wedges.
In Figure 2-6(b) the input to the system is a crude hand-drawn sketch of a directed graph.
The system analyzes the spatial relations between the elongated components and the circular
ones to distinguish between edges, vertices, and edge-labels. The system distinguishes an
edge label of "0" from a vertex by its relative position with respect to the edges. The system
can use the graph structure extracted to control some application or simply render it as
shown.
Figure 2-6(c) shows a "layout" application. The input to the system is a set of panels with
a unique number of dots on each one, and a master page which contains a crude sketch of
the desired layout. The system segments the master page into different regions and pairs
each region with an input panel based on a count of the number of dots. Finally the panels
are laid out in the corresponding regions.
Figure 2-6(d) shows an "editing" application. A transparent slide is overlayed on a doc-
ument, and editing marks are made on it (e.g, delete, move, rotate). The slide and the
document are scanned in, the system analyzes the marks, determines the portions of the
document that are being reffered to, and applies the transformations.
As mentioned before, the important point here is that each of these applications was written2
using the same set of primitives. The following sections describe the set of primitives, and
go through the complete visual routine for the pie-chart example in Figure 2-6(a).
2.5.1 Primitives of the RG system
All primitive operations of the RG system are defined over three types of quantities.
The first type of quantity is called a Property Map. Property maps show the values that
a particular property takes on at every location in the image. Orientation is one such
property, for example. Property maps are defined across scales in a positionally exhaustive
way. That is, moving to a coarser scale only increases the local area over which the property
is computed, it does not change the number of locations at which the property is computed.
Property maps are represented by heirarchichal levels of integer arrays.
The second type of quantity is a Location Map. Location maps show the locations at which
some property assumes a certain value, for example all locations in the image that are
red, or all locations in the image that are inside some region. One can perform Boolean
operations over the domain of Location Maps. Location maps are represented by bitmaps.
The third type of quantity is a Summary Value. It is the result of applying a summarizing
function over particular regions of property or location maps. The perimeter is one such
2all these applications were hand-coded by the author, there were not automatically generated by the
system
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Figure 2-7: The area operator. Each location is labeled with the area of the region to which
it belongs.
summarizing function. A mapping between regions and summary values is obtained as a
result of applying the summarizing function.
There are three classes of elementary operations defined over the three basic data types.
1. LocationMap -+ PropertyMap
2. PropertyMap -4 LocationMap
3. PropertyMap x LocationMap x Summarizer -+ SummaryValue
The first class of operators establishes properties at locations, the second class selects lo-
cations from Property Maps, and the third class summarizes property values over selected
regions.
Establishing properties: Location map -+ Property map
This class of operations takes a location map and at every location computes some property
to yield a property map. There are several types of properties computed.
Region limited properties. A region is a set of connected locations on a location map.
This class of operations compute some global property that is a function of all the locations
that constitute a region, and then produces an image with each location of the region labeled
with the "global" property. The Area operator for instance simply finds the areas of the
regions in the location map. Each pixel of each region is labeled with the area of that region
as shown in the schematic in Figure 2-7. Other examples are of region limited properties
are elongation, connected components, and the angle of the axis of least inertia.
Diameter limited properties. At each location a property of all the locations within
some constant radius around that location is computed. Orientation, size, and density are
examples of such properties.
Relative Spatial properties. This class of operators computes one or more links at
every location. A link from location A to B indicates the association of pixel A with pixel B
because of some property, for example B might be the region nearest to pixel A. The Nearest
Neighbor operator for instance takes a location map as input produces an image where each
location has a link to the nearest location of the region nearest to it, as shown in as shown
in the schematic of Figure 2-8. The positionally exhaustive link information is very useful
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Figure 2-9: Left: The location map. Right: The Vornoi diagram obtained from Nearest
Neighbor links and Connected Component information
in computing other properties like grouping. For example, the link information and the
connected Components information could be used to compute a Vornoi diagram in one step
in the following trivial way: Each location labels itself with the connected-component label
of the location it is linked to. Figure 2-9 shows an example of a location
Selecting locations with certain properties: Property map -+ Location Map
Select locations that have a particular property value This operation selects all
locations that have a particular value from a property image as shown in the schematic of
Figure 2-10.
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Location Map
SelectLocations>
Figure 2-10: Only locations that have a particular value are selected.
Location Map
Location Map
Color
Location Seeds
Figure 2-11: Only regions colored by the seed locations are selected.
Property or Location Map Summary Values
Region Value
U Summary 27
Function
32
Figure 2-12: A summarizer function computes the summary over regions and delivers a
mapping between region and value
Coloring This operation selects locations that are connected to a particular bunch of seed
locations. This is accomplished by coloring from the seed locations and stopping at the
boundaries defined by the regions. Figure 2-11 shows a schematic.
Computing the aggregate of a property over a region: Property Map x Location
Map -+ Summary Values
The third class of operations summarizes information over regions to yield a mapping be-
tween regions and values. Any function that maps many values to one can be used as the
summarizer function, for example area, perimeter, mean, mode, AND, OR e.t.c.
2.5.2 An example of a visual routine in the RG language
In this section I show an example of a visual routine implemented with the primitives
described in the previous section. Figure 2-13(a) shows an image of a pie-chart. The
problem is to "find the smallest wedge in the pie-chart". The main goal of going through
this example in detail are:
* To introduce the idea of a visual routine being a sequence of operations chosen from
a small family of operations.
* To show the compositional power of the basis set of operations in the RG system.
(a) The input (b) The Size property (c) The result of se-
lecting the component
of maximum size
Figure 2-13: The first two steps of
this pie-chart
(a) The
property
distance
Figure 2-14: The last four steps of
this pie-chart
the visual routine for extracting the smallest wedge in
O
(b) The cen-
ter
(c) Direction
the visual routine for extracting the smallest wedge in
Areas: LocationMap -+ PropertyMap The first operation takes the location map and
computes an "Area" property map. That is, each black pixel in the location map is labeled
with the area (a number) of the connected component to which the pixel belongs, giving
the result shown in Figure 2-13(b).
Select Max Size: LocationMap +- PropertyMap Having computed the "size" property
we now select the component that has the maximum size. This operation yields the perime-
ter of the pie-chart as shown in Figure 2-13(c).
Distance: LocationMap -+ PropertyMap Having extracted the perimeter of the pie-chart,
we apply the "distance" property to the perimeter location map. The result as shown in
Figure 2-14(a) is that each white pixel gets labeled with its distance from the closest black
pixel.
(a) Selection of direc- (b) Areas (c) Areas
tion ranges
Figure 2-15: The final steps of the visual routine for extracting the smallest wedge in this
pie-chart
Select max distance component: LocationMap +- PropertyMap The component with
the maximum values of the distance property is selected. This is done by looking at the
distributions of the distance property over each connected component and selecting the one
with the highest mean. The result as shown in Figure 2-14(b) is that the center of the
pie-chart is selected.
Direction: LocationMap -+ PropertyMap Applying the direction property to the loca-
tion map containing only the center component of the pie-chart yields a property map where
each white pixel is labeled with its direction from the nearest center pixel. The result of
this operation is shown in Figure 2-14(c).
Select ranges of direction: LocationMap +- PropertyMap Each of the components now
has a distribution of directions from the property map computed in the previous step. The
components with unimodal distributions are selected, this yields the elongated spokes of
the pie chart. Each of these spokes has a dominant mode in direction. All the pixels with
directions between successive values of the modes of the spokes are selected thus yielding
each individual wedge, as shown in Figure 2-15(a)
Areas: LocationMap -- PropertyMap Having extracted the locations of each of the wedges,
we apply the Area operator again (but this time on the wedge locations, not the locations in
the original input of Figure 2-13(a). This yields the property map shown in Figure 2-15(b)
with each pixel labeled with the area of the wedge to which it belongs.
Select min Area: LocationMap +- PropertyMap Finally we simply select the pixels with
the minimum value from the area property map just computed, yielding the locations of
the smallest wedge as shown in Figure 2-15(c).
2.5.3 A critique of the RG system
In section 2.2.1 we listed two key issues that a visual routines proposal must deal with.
Mahoney squarely focuses on the first issue, namely of assembling a rich, expressive set of
C
primitives. How successful has he been at doing this?
As mentioned in section 2.5 the RG system has been used by this author to write visual
routines for several document processing applications. The language is expressive, in that
the programs for extracting spatial relations and properties are compact. For instance the
program for computing the Vornoi regions of an image is less than five lines.
As demonstrated by the example in 2.5.2 the RG system derives its effectiveness from one
simple but powerful idea: Spatial relations can be extracted by selecting locations, using
them as a "frame of reference" to establish certain properties, then selecting other locations
based on those properties and repeating this cycle over and over again. As we will see in
the next chapter this idea also carries over to real images - albeit with different kinds of
selection operations and properties.
2.6 What is a visual routine?
There are a several different notions of the term "visual routine" that have been used in
the works described above.
The original definition of visual routines by Ullman [58] views them as a sequence of "prim-
itive" operations drawn from a fixed basis set in order to extract some spatial relation from
a scene. Mahoney and Rao's visual routines for binary images are consistent with this
definition. Chapman on the other hand views visual routines as patterns of visual activity
that emerge due to interaction with a changing environment. He uses the word "routine"
literally in the sense of habit, as rote or repeating activity, for example my tendency to look
at the top-left corner of my screen every time I hear a beep, to check if the mailbox icon
has changed color, is one of the routine visual activities that I engage in. Both Ullman's
and Chapman's perspectives on visual routines are important and even though they may
seem different from each other they are in fact very closely related and simply emphasizing
different modes of visual attention3
Chapman's emphasizes the "pattern of visual activity" rather than the "extraction of spatial
relations". My visual routine for checking to see if I have email does not have much of a
spatial component to it (other than looking at the top-left corner of my screen). On the
other hand my visual routine for checking to see what somebody is looking at does need to
have some spatial sophistication, in that I will have to locate the persons head, the eyes, get
the gaze direction, and then look along that direction for some salient object. The point here
is that in both of these examples of visual routines, Chapman's emphasis is simply on the
fact that they are both patterns of visual activity. Ullman on the other hand is concerned
with fleshing out the spatial machinery of the visual routines that make it possible to locate
the top-left corner of the screen or the gaze direction of the eyes.
Yet another characterization of visual routines views them as a sequence of operations to
accomplish visual "search". For example searching for conjunctions of features like a blue
L among a field of green L's and blue T's [14]. Viewing a visual routine as a procedure for
"visual search" is popular in the machine-vision literature. However, "search" is just one of
the functions of visual routines. It would be hard and artificial to cast many of the spatial
31 will have more to say about this point in the next two chapters.
problems of Figure 2-1 as "search".
2.7 Open issues
My criteria for evaluating a visual routines proposal are
* Is it a proposal for real-world images?
* How versatile is the spatial analysis machinery at extracting different kinds of spatial
relations?
* Is there a scheme for automatically generating visual routines?
Among the works reviewed in the previous sections "Jeeves" is the only one that deals with
real images. However, as we saw, the focus there was on the control architecture (enumer-
ation and backtracking of logic variables) rather than on the mechanisms for extracting
spatial relations. Mahoney and Rao do focus on spatial mechanisms, but their mechanisms
do not carry over very well to real images because of the difficulty of figure-ground segmen-
tation and the dynamic nature of the real world. Neither Horswill, nor Mahoney & Rao
deal with the issue of how visual routines might be composed or automatically generated.
Chapman has demonstrated some novel ideas about situated activity that provide an al-
ternative approach to "composing" visual routines, namely visual routines just "emerge"
from interaction with the environment. However his architecture for visual routines is very
specific to the simulated world of the Amazon video game where the spatial relations that
need to be extracted are known in advance.
In the following chapters:
* I present an architecture for visual routines for extracting a wide variety of spatial
relations from real-world dynamic images. Another way of looking at this is a kind of
"language of visual attention" that can be used to construct programs (visual routines)
for extracting spatial relations.
* I also directly address the issue of how visuospatial concepts/expectations can be
learned from experience and thereafter generate visual routines.
2.8 Summary
In this chapter we discussed the problem of finding a spatial analysis machinery for real-
world visuospatial problems. The important requirement was that the machinery be ver-
satile enough to deal with a variety of problems. The are several reasons for insisting on
a common framework to handle all these problems: scalability, learning, and the fact that
there is something that is common to all the tasks listed in Figure 2-1. We adopted a
"visual routine" framework proposed by Ullman, and reviewed some of the work on visual
routines. We saw that there are still several open issues regarding the construction of a
versatile mechanism for real images. However the following ideas from the reviewed work
do carry over to the solution that we discuss in the following chapters:
* The power of composing visual routines by repeatedly choosing primitives from a
small set of operations.
* The fact that visual routines work by repeatedly setting up successive frames of ref-
erence.
* The fact that visual routines may emerge from interaction with the environment,
rather than being planned.
Chapter 3
An Architecture for Visual Routines
Chapter Outline
In this chapter I present a language of visual attention for generating visual
routines. Visual routines are sequences of operations for extracting spatial
relations, or more generally patterns of activity in attentional state. This
chapter lays out the families of spatial operations, and illustrates their use
with some examples of visual routines. Finally, I compare my model of
visual attention to other models of visual attention in psychophysics, and
neuroscience.
3.1 Visual routines for real images
In the following sections I describe the architecture and primitives of a system for construct-
ing visual routines, and then use this visual routine language to construct visual routines for
some spatial tasks. In what sense is the proposed model a language? The word em language
is used because the model is generative in the same way that one generates sentences of a
language by stringing together elements of syntactic categories. The only difference is that
the sentences in the language of attention are procedures for extracting spatial relations.
A visual routine for even a "simple" task like deciding which of two objects is bigger,
exercises many visual as well as non-visual faculties. In order to build an architecture that
supports visual routines for a variety of spatial tasks one cannot avoid confronting many
of the hard problems in vision like figure-ground segmentation, feature tracking, and shape
recognition, to name only a few. One way of avoiding some of these problems is to simplify
the environment by using children's blocks, or painting the walls, or recording images from
a clean desk, or a rotating turntable, or restricting the kinds of events that can take place.
I have tried to avoid such simplifications. Instead, I have tried to use crude approximations
to the hard problems. Another factor that has made the architecture design hard is that
this is not a system with a specific task or goal. In fact, the whole point of this enterprise
is to build a substrate that can support a variety of goals and spatial tasks like the ones in
Figure 2-1.
How then should one evaluate the architecture that is going to be presented? The bottom
line is how expressive are the set of primitives presented? That is, how large is the set
of spatial tasks for which one could write visual routines using these primitives? We will
return to this question towards the end of the chapter.
Figure 3-1 is an overview of the architecture of the system. The system can be divided into
three distinct levels. At the first level (starting at the bottom) early-visual and preattentive
properties are computed. The defining characteristic of this level is that the image properties
are computed independent of the task at hand. The preattentive properties computed at
this level are available to next one. The second level, which is the main focus of this chapter,
shows the machinery for visual routines. At this level the top down goals and bottom-up
information from the preattentive stage are used to fashion a specific visual routine. A
visual routine in my framework, as mentioned earlier, is a sequence of operations drawn
repeatedly from a basis set of operations. The third layer of the system consists of a
collection of primitive behaviors each of which have specific biases about where to look
next.
The following sections describe the first two levels of the architecture. The third level, which
involves exploratory behaviors and mechanisms for learning patterns in visual activity, is
the subject of the next chapter.
3.2 Early Vision
The early visual representation of the scene consists of the following components:
1. A 20 dimensional vector at every point in the image. This vector is obtained by
applying 5 spatial filters across 4 different scales to the gray-scale component of the
image.
2. A 60 dimensional vector at every point in the image. This vector is obtained by
applying 5 spatial filters across 4 different scales to each of the 3 normalized color
components of the image.
3. Motion information consisting of the location and direction of motion.
4. A color saliency map - indicating blobs of high color contrast
The above choice of features may be characterized as "blob-vision", because it makes explicit
blobs of various sizes and orientation, and their direction of motion. The decision to make
blobs rather than regions (of arbitrary shape and size) explicit, is because blobs are much
easier to compute and localize. Furthermore, segmenting an image into regions must require
some top-down biases about the task. Segmenting the image into regions at an early stage
may not only be hard but also ill-defined with purely bottom-up information (we return to
this point in our discussion of color-segmentation later in this section).
The rest of this section describes the five components listed above and also the tradeoffs in
making this particular choice of early visual features.
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Figure 3-1: An overview of the architecture of the system
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3.2.1 Spatial derivatives
For the spatial filters I use the steerable first and second order Gaussian filters as described
by Freeman & Adelson [13]. The Gaussian function (shown with a sigma of 1 for conve-
nience) is:
G(x, y) = e- (X2 +y 2 ) (3.1)
The first order derivatives in the 0 and 90 degree directions, i.e. derivatives with respect to
x and y are:
G1l = -2xe-(2 y2 ) (3.2)
G1, = -2ye-_( 2+y 2 ) (3.3)
The x and y derivatives completely span the space of all first order directional derivatives.
In other words the directional first derivative in any arbitrary direction 0 can be synthesized
as a linear combination of the x and y derivatives:
Glo = cos(0)G1l + sin(O)Gly (3.4)
The second order derivatives Gx, Gxy, and Gyy can be similarly computed. From these
partial derivatives the directional derivatives in the 0, 60, and 120 degree directions can be
calculated. The Go, G60, and G120 responses span the space of all second order directional
derivatives.
G20 = ki(0)Glo + k2 (0)G2 60 + k3 (0)G2120  (3.5)
where
k(0) = [1 + 2 cos(2( - Oj))] (3.6)
using 01 = 0, 02 = 60, and 03 = 120
The G1x, Gly, G2 0 , G260, and G2 120 filters are applied to the image at different scales.
The G1 and G2 filters correspond to edge and blob detectors respectively. Figure 3-2(b)
shows the 5 filters and the result of applying them to an image at 4 different scales. Each
point in the image therefore has a response vector of 20 elements. The feature vector at a
point of interest in the image (shown with green cross hairs) is shown as a vector in Figure
3-2. These feature vectors are identical to the ones used by Rao & Ballard [47], except that
their vectors have an additional set of four G3 responses at each scale.
Figure 3-2 shows the application of the spatial filters to the gray-scale component of the
image. The same filters are also applied to the normalized color components of the image,
that is to the R/I, G/I, and B/I images, where I = (R + G + B). The 20 responses for each
of these three color components is lumped together into one 60 dimensional vector.
Edge-detection. I have preferred to work with the raw spatial derivatives rather than
edges, firstly because thresholding introduces unwanted parameters at an early stage, and
secondly I am assuming that any regions of interest will be picked up by the blob detectors.
True, this is an assumption about the environment, however the alternative of finding edges
and stitching them together correctly to derive the boundary of a region is an unsolved
problem, see Sha'ashua and Ullman[50], Alter and Basri[2] for such approaches. The choice
that I have made does well for the minimal amount of computation it requires.
(a) G1.
filter
(b) G1,
filter
(c) G2 0
filter
(d) G2 60o
filter
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(f) The result of applying the 5 filters in (a)-(e) across 4 different scales. From left to
right we have responses to the first derivative w.r.t. x, first derivative w.r.t. y, blob
detector at 0 degrees, blob detector at 60 degrees, and blob detector at 120 degrees
(g) The image and a
point of interest
(h) The 20 dimensional
feature vector at the
point of interest
Figure 3-2: Early vision: spatial filter responses are computed across many scales
(a) The image (b) First difference (c) Flow direction, col-
thresholded orcoded. Green indi-
cates upward movement
Figure 3-3: Early Vision: Motion information
3.2.2 Motion
The motion component of the early visual representation is shown in Figure 3-3. A sim-
ple correlation scheme is used to compute optical flow, as follows: after finding the first
difference in brightness and thresholding it we get the locations in the image where there
has been a significant change of brightness as shown in Figure 3-3(b). At each of these
locations we grab a fixed sized patch centered on the first difference location in the previ-
ous image and search for that patch around that location in the current image. In other
words we are establishing a correspondence between the previous image and the current
one only at locations with significant changes of brightness. The correspondence gives the
displacement vectors for the flow. The chief drawback of this method is that for very fast
moving objects (or more precisely, when the displacement of object patches between frames
is more than the search radius for the patches) the method gives totally erroneous results.
One way to address this is to look at motion at multiple scales (just as we do for the spatial
derivatives). I have not implemented a pyramidal scheme for motion computation but the
reader is referred to Bergen and Hingorani [4] for such an approach. The multiple scale flow
computation picks up large displacements at coarse scales, and propagates the flow down to
finer scales. The correlation scheme that I use is only applied at a single scale but suffices
for my purposes because I am interested in only the gross direction of motion of the patches
on the object, not the precise magnitude of the displacement.
3.2.3 Color saliency and segmentation
Finally I compute a bottom-up measure of color saliency to highlight blobs of high color
contrast. An example is shown in Figure 3-4. The color saliency is computed simply by
adding together the response of the blob detectors to the color components of the image.
This is clearly very simplistic, a more sophisticated measure of saliency would find the color
gradient everywhere, do some form of color segmentation and take the contour integral of
the gradient for each region, yielding a measure of saliency of the region. Horswill [21] uses
such a method in his Visual Routine Processor architecture.
See Pal[40] for a review of color segmentation techniques. Color Segmentation - the bottom-
up segmentation of the image into a bunch of uniform color regions, is something I did ex-
Figure 3-4: Bottom-up color salience
plore but discarded as being too unreliable. There are two reasons why color segmentation
of the whole image at an early stage is not a good idea. Firstly we do not have a good
understanding of color perception - the human visual system extracts something that is
experienced as "color" which remains remarkably invariant to changes in illumination. In
machine vision we are still far from extracting that invariant from the RGB signal, con-
sequently color segmentation algorithms are still very sensitive to changes in illumination.
Secondly, segmenting the image into regions before we know the task at hand is wasteful
because the location(s) of interest for the task may not be any of the bottom-up color seg-
ments (for instance it may be where the tip of your pen meets the paper - rather than the
paper or the pen by themselves). I feel that color salience is a more robust property at the
early-vision level.
The decision about what kind of method should be used to compute color saliency, or
whether we should do any color-segmentation clearly depends on what we want to use the
results for. In the case of this system, the color saliency is computed just to suggest where
next to look at. As the localization of regions is not my goal, using the responses of the
color blob detectors to suggest hot spots where attention should be diverted, suffices for my
purposes.
3.2.4 Depth
The system currently does not extract any depth information. Depth/Gradient informa-
tion would certainly have been very useful for figure/ground segmentation [17], detecting
occlusion, or making surfaces explicit [16]. However, given that making a visual routines
architecture for 2D images is hard enough, I did not want to burden ourselves with the
computation of depth/gradient information.
3.2.5 Grouping of low-level features
There has been considerable work on perceptual grouping [50][2][28] - the grouping of low-
level features like a bunch of line terminators that are aligned, into a high-order feature.
Such processes would have produced a richer early-visual representation. However I did not
explore this avenue because I wanted to start with a simple set of features.
Move Focus of
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Figure 3-5: Framework for organizing the primitive operations
3.2.6 Choice of the early visual representation
So far in this section I have described the five components that make up the choice of the
early visual representation that is passed on to higher stages. There is clearly a tremendous
simplification here compared to the kinds of features that have been suggested (see the
classic text by Marr [30] for instance) as components of a 21D sketch.
There are many other well known early vision features that have been omitted from the
choice that has been made. Treisman [14] and her collaborators have designed a "pop-out"
paradigm for testing if a particular feature is part of the early-visual representation or not.
The feature in question is presented in an array of distractors. If the feature "pops-out"
i.e. clearly draws attention to itself irrespective of the size of the distractor array then it is
regarded as being part of the early-visual/preattentive representation. A long list of such
features is being compiled. Clearly the nature of the early visual representation is still an
active area of research, and I have tried to choose as simple a set as possible without getting
bogged down at this stage because the main focus of this thesis on the next stage where
task-specific visual routines are synthesized.
3.3 The visual routine architecture
In this section I describe the visual routine primitive operations and their organization. It
is at this stage in the architecture that a top-down task specification and the bottom-up
early visual information result in the synthesis of a visual routine from the set of primitive
operations.
Before I describe the individual primitive operations, a high-level overview of the organi-
zation of the primitives is in order. Figure 3-5 shows a simple framework for organizing
the primitive operations. All visual routines can be viewed as a sequence of operations
chosen from three broad families of operations. One class of operations moves the focus of
attention. Another class of operations establishes properties at and with respect to the focus
of attention. A third class of operations selects locations by selecting ranges of values of
the scene properties just established. The attentional state consists of scene properties that
have been established during prior foveations.
A typical visual routine follows the flow of control indicated in the schematic, where we
move the focus of attention to a new location, then establish one or more scene properties,
then perhaps store some of these scene properties in attentional state and also if necessary
compare the current scene properties to previously stored properties in the attentional state.
Then we select some location(s) in the image based on the scene properties just established,
move to the new location ... and the cycle continues (with not necessarily the same choices
of scene properties and selection operations of course).
The preceding description of a visual routine simply stresses the sequential nature of visual
routines and the three classes of operations. The following is a higher-level non-mechanistic
view of what these sequences of operations are doing.
* Visual routines establish local contexts, and use them as a local frame of reference to
select the next place to look at. For example a visual routine to locate a person's hand
may first locate the person, and use the size, position of head, and torso to constrain
the locations where the hand may be found.
* Visual routines monitor changes in attentional state. The representation of many
abstract spatial concepts like "picking up something" or "falling off" is in terms of
changes in certain spatial properties that are monitored.
For the next several sections you will see explanations of the individual pieces of Figure 3-5.
While these descriptions are essential to understand the core of the system, it is easy to get
lost in the detail and lose track of the fact that these operations work together to make a
visual routine. Concrete examples of visual routines will be presented after the descriptions
of the primitive operations.
3.4 Moving the focus of Attention
There are three ways in which the focus of attention of the system can be moved:
1. Saccading to a location. The focus of attention simply jumps from one point to another
with an arbitrarily large displacement.
2. em Tracing a feature. A feature like a curve is continuously traced, i.e with very short
displacements in the focus of attention.
3. em Tracking. The focus of attention continuously follows an object as it moves about.
3.5 Establishing properties at the focus of attention
While the early visual properties are computed everywhere, all the time, there are some
operations that are applied only at the focus of attention (FOA). As mentioned in section
2.1, the eye-movement experiments of Yarbus tell us very little about what is going on at
the focus of attention. In Figure 2-2(c) for instance when the focus of attention jumps from
the central woman to the child seated at the table (or the other way around, the trace is not
Scene Properties at/w.r.t Associated Operations
the Focus of Attention
1 Figure 1 figure-ground_motion
2 figuregroundfv
2 Figure Attributes 3 getsize
4 getdirection
5 getorientation
3 Local Region 6 match-local-context
Spatial Relations 7 match_regionsrelative
4 Relative Marker Distributions 8 matchmarker_distributions
Table 3.1: Eight operations which can be applied at the focus of attention, divided into
four classes by the scene properties that they are associated with.
labeled with time), what kinds of scene properties are being extracted at each location? In
this particular case the size of the individuals may be extracted as clues to their age. The
point here is that we have little idea about the computations being performed at the focus
of attention to accomplish the task at hand. However, a specification of the vocabulary
of operations at the focus of attention, that are available to the visual system, is essential
for any realistic model of visual attention1 . In this subsection I describe my choice for the
vocabulary of properties and operations at the FOA.
A note about my use of the terms "properties" and "operations": properties refer to the
kind of thing being extracted, for instance the "figure" at the FOA, or "the local spatial
context around the figure". Every property has one or more associated operations to extract
it. Furthermore there are operations to compare properties (e.g. an operation to compare
local spatial contexts). Table 3.1 shows a list of scene properties established at the focus of
attention and the associated operations. The value in separating properties from operations
is that even though future models of attention may propose different sets of operations, I
believe that the properties with which they will be associated, will not be very different
from the ones proposed here.
I now describe the operations of Table 3.1 in more detail.
3.5.1 Establishing the Figure at the FOA
Separating the figure from ground has been one of the major problems of machine vision. I
take the position that there are several independent candidates for the figure at the focus
of attention, and that it is up to the task to decide which one should be used. The system
currently uses two independent bottom-up methods to determine the figure.
figureground_motion: Motion information is particularly valuable for figure/ground seg-
mentation. The first temporal derivative in image brightness is thresholded to obtain the
location of the moving points (actually only the edges), and then a connected components
algorithm is run over the binary location image to segment the points into different groups
based on their proximity to each other. The group/figure that is closest to the current
1I discuss this important point at the end of the chapter, where existing models of attention are reviewed.
(a) An image from a se- (b) Motion figure at the
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Figure 3-6: figure ground candidate from motion information
Figure 3-7: figure ground candidate from motion information: The dominant component of
the filter response suggests the size and orientation of the figure at the FOA
point of foveation is chosen as the current figure. However, this group/figure is closer to
the silhouette of the figure we really want because first the temporal derivative only yields
information near spatial edges. An additional step is necessary to identify the points in-
side the moving figure. The phenomenon by which points inside a moving figure inherit
the motion of the edges of the figure is known as "motion capture". I use the heuristic of
common-fate to implement motion-capture - points that are surrounded by moving points
that belong to the same figure, are also labeled as part of the figure. Figure 3-6(b) shows
an example of the result of the motion capture algorithm. The approximations used in the
figuregroundmotion primitive have several limitations. First difference locations are not
indicative of the motion locations for fast motion (large displacements) and the local prox-
imity rule used to get the connected components is very sensitive to noise. It would be better
to connect some higher-level feature (edge segments based on smoothness, or patches) rather
than points to make it more robust. In spite of these problems the figureground_motion
primitive gets the silhouette of the moving feature most of the time.
figureground_fv: If one views the image as a collection of blobs and edges of different
sizes and orientations, then the dominant blob or edge at a particular point in the image
is a crude but perfectly good candidate for the figure at that point. This blob or edge may
be part of a larger figure, the arm of a human for instance. The dominant blob or edge at
the point of foveation is trivial to extract; it is simply the maximum component of the 20
dimensional feature vector at the point of foveation. Figure 3-7 shows an example. I define
whatever this returns as the figure at the focus of attention.
Clearly the two procedures for bottom-up figure-ground described above are selecting very
different kinds of figures. The first one is selecting entire moving objects, the second one
is selecting salient blobs or edges, whether they are moving or not. Both the motion and
spatial feature-vector candidates for the figure are available, the task will decide which one
gets used.
An important bottom-up candidate for the figure which I have not implemented comes
from selecting edges of the same disparity at or near the focus of attention. Grimson,
Lakshmiratan et al, [17] show that the true role of stereo may not be to extract absolute
depth (for which the error increases rapidly with error in angle of vergence) but to suggest
which edges may belong to the same figure based on having disparity values close to the
disparity value at the point of vergence.
Besides ignoring the other bottom-up candidates for figure-ground segmentation, I am also
ignoring the role of top-down biases exerted by object models on figure-ground segmen-
tation. It may not be correct to assume that figure-ground segmentation must precede
object-recognition. The two processes may be closely intertwined, with bottom-up figure
candidates selecting some object models which in turn insert top-down biases that "fill-in"
parts of the figure. A discussion of these important issues is outside the scope of this thesis.
The two bottom-up candidates of figure described above should suffice for my purposes.
Having established the figure at the focus of attention, we establish some attributes of the
figure.
3.5.2 Establishing Figure attributes at the FOA
getorientation The orientation of the figure is the dominant orientation of the spatial
feature vector.
getsize The size of the figure is simply the scale at which the dominant orientation exists.
getdirection Assuming that the figure has been tracked for the past few frames, the
direction of motion of the figure is the average direction over the past few frames.
Note that all the figure attributes are of the dominant blob/edge extracted by figureground_fv.
We now move on to discussing two families of operations: one for extracting spatial re-
lations between regions, and the other for spatial relations between features that can be
approximated by point markers. Figure 3-8 motivates the need for two types of operations
for capturing relative spatial relations. Figure 3-8 shows two regions that are in different
spatial configurations. In the case of (a) when the regions are "far" apart, the distance and
direction between the centroids of the regions is sufficient for capturing the spatial rela-
tionships between the regions. However, when the regions are close together as in (b), the
centroids are poor replacements for the regions, a different representation will be needed.
One way of looking at the two types of operations is in terms of local versus global measures
of spatial relations, where "local" is defined with respect to the size and extent of the region
of interest.
3.5.3 Establishing Local Spatial Relations between Regions at the FOA
One class of operations at the FOA is devoted to establishing local spatial relations between
Regions in the image. In particular we will consider the local spatial context - the portion
of the image in the immediate vicinity of (and including) the figure. The size of the local
(a) Markers are good at (b) Pairwise brightness
capturing relative spa- ratios are good at cap-
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gions are close together
Figure 3-8: Two kinds of spatial mechanisms are needed for capturing global and local
relations between regions.
context is decided by the size of the figure. In the case of the figure from motion the
bounding box of the figure is used as the local context, as shown in Figure 3-6(a). In the
case of the figure returned by figure_ground fv, the local context is the bounding box
of the dominant spatial filter. Figure 3-9 shows several examples of local contexts around
motionfigures.
Why is the local spatial context important? It is an empirical fact about our world that
it has repeating local structure. Several spatial relations like being "on" something, or
"touching" something, or "inside" something, are examples of purely local spatial relations,
in the sense that the spatial extent of the receptors needed to detect these relations between
two regions, does not grow with the size of the regions.
One way of capturing local structure, i.e. the distribution of "stuff" around the point of
foveation, is to compute pairwise brightness ratios between patches, as used by Sinha[51].
Figure 3-9(b) shows a schematic. The image is divided into a mosaic of patches, and the
ratios of the brightnesses between every pair of patches is computed, giving a cross-ratio
matrix as shown in (c).
match_local_contexts: The ratio-matrix acts as a template for the patch, and can be used
for matching. Figure 3-9(c) shows the top fifty matches to the image in (a). All of these
local contexts were acquired autonomously by the system during scene exploration2 . Note
that the template does a good job of retrieving humans in similar postures. The retrieval
of the blue-ball in the last few images is understandable given that the silhouette of the
rising person matches the silhouette of the ball. The use of ratio-templates was proposed
by Sinha[51] as a representation for objects.
2I will discuss scene exploration in the next chapter
(a) (b) (c) The
ratio-
template for
(a)
(d) The best matching local contexts
Figure 3-9: Matching local contexts: A sample local context is shown in (a), and the
corresponding ratios matrix of this context is shown in (c). The image in (a) is matched to
several previously acquired local contexts, the best matches are show in (d)
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Figure 3-10: Markers on salient features are useful for monitoring their gross relative posi-
tions
Selector description
1 selectcolor Select locations that match a
particular color
2 select _fv Select locations that match a
feature response vector
3 select_blob atscale Select all blobs at a particular scale
4 select motion Select all locations moving in a particular direction
5 select regionrelative Select locations that are in a particular
spatial configuration with respect to a region
6 select _marker-relative Select the likely locations for a marker based
on its relative position to other markers
Table 3.2: Selection operations
3.5.4 Global spatial relations between markers
Another class of operations at the FOA is devoted to establishing global relative spatial
relations between widely separated regions in the image. As mentioned earlier, sometimes
regions may be simply characterized by a single "point-marker", and the relative spatial
relations by the distance and direction between point markers. Figure 3-10 shows an exam-
ple where markers on the head, arm, and object, are used to characterize a "pickup" event.
The relative positions of markers is useful in capturing certain invariances in scenes and
events. The relationship between the markers shown in Figure 3-10 is not very different
even in different instances of "picking-up" objects.
3.6 Selecting Locations
Operators that select locations in the image take a property image, and a range of values
as input and and simply selects locations in the property image that fall within that range.
Table 3.2 shows the selection operations used by the system. Selection operations may be
composed - for example one can select all blobs of a particular size within a certain distance
and direction of the point of foveation.
3.7 Attentional State
Attentional state consists of:
1. The current figure, its direction of motion, and its local context.
2. Previously selected regions, their figure attributes, and their local global spatial rela-
tions with respect to the current figure.
This concludes the description of the architecture of the system. We are now finally ready
to see how the families of operations described in the previous sections work together.
3.8 Examples of visual routines
In this section I present some examples of visual routines which will use the operations
described in the previous section. While the tasks may appear to be different, the visual
routines described in this section all use the same framework (shown in Figure 3-5) of
foveating to a location, establishing some properties with respect to the point of foveation,
selecting certain locations, and then moving on to the next foveation while monitoring
changes in attentional state.
It should be clarified that in the following examples the sequence of operations that make up
the visual routine were programmed, they were not automatically sequenced by the system.
The automatic composition of visual routines by learning from experience is the subject of
the next chapter. The emphasis in this chapter is on the basic attentional framework for
visual routines.
3.8.1 Example 1
Figure 3-12 shows two scenes where a human is trying to direct the attention of the
robot/room to a particular object. The task is to construct a visual routine that will direct
the system to the object being pointed to, by stringing together operations described in the
previous sections. Figure 3-11 shows a schematic of the order in which the operations are
applied. The goal here is not to construct the best pointing-gesture-recognition-program,
but to show the utility of the particular choice I have made for the language of attention.
This example highlights a point made earlier in this chapter (in section 3.3) about what
visual routines do: they establish local contexts, and use them as a local frame of reference
to select the next place to look at.
Find the human I At first the system must find the human in the scene. It uses a "human
template "that is formed out of G1G2 kernel feature vectors. Figure 3-13(a) shows the points
that make up the template (each point has a G1G2 feature vector associated with it). Such
templates are very similar to ratio-templates [51] and are in a form suitable for learning
from experience. Figure 3-13(c) shows the results of applying the template to all locations
in the image in (b). The red locations in (c) indicate a high match at the center of the
human.
motion in expected area
at expected scale
Saccade to salient obj
Figure 3-11: This schematic shows the composition of the operations
that is being pointed to
for detecting the object
(a) (b)
Figure 3-12: The system has to determine the object that the human is pointing to and
look at it.
Saccade to the human
- get size ot the human
- use size to determine
scale of arm
- use size to select
region w.r.t. body
where arm might move.
Saccade to Arm
- get orientation of arm
- use orientation to select
portion of room
- select the most salient
region in that portion.
(a) The human template (b) The image (c)
Figure 3-13: A "human template" is applied everywhere, the high value locations indicated
in red suggest the locations at which a human might be present
Saccade to the human Figure 3-14(b) shows the system saccading to the location with
the highest match.
Having isolated the human, the next task is for the system to isolate the hand with respect
to the body, and then shift attention to the hand.
The next task is to detect if the human is in the process of pointing at something. The
system attends to motion within a certain radius of the point of foveation. Furthermore, it
uses the size of the human it is looking at to select the scale at which it must search for the
arm.
Figure 3-14(d)shows the area around the point of foveation being monitored for motion.
Figure 3-14(e) Shows the subset of monitored locations at which motion is detected.
Select "arm-scale" blobs in the motion region I The size of the human determines
the scale at which the arm is likely to be detected. Only blobs at this lower scale (at which
the arm is likely to be detected) are attended to in the moving regions. Figure 3-14(g)
shows the likely locations of the arm.
Saccade to the arm Figure 3-14(i)shows the system at its new point of foveation on
the arm. Having saccaded to the arm - which is now the focus of attention - the orientation
of the arm is determined.
Select a region in the room Figure 3-15(d) shows the region selected in the room. The
system's attention now shifts to the selected region of space. Within this space it selects a
blob that is salient in its color contrast. Figure Figure 3-15(e) shows the bottom-up color
salience everywhere in the image. Figure 3-15(g) shows the system finally saccading to the
most salient location within the selected region. In this particular example the location
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Figure 3-15: The system uses the hand orientation to select an area of the room and saccade
to the most salient blob there
1225 1
(b) Deter-
mine
the orien-
tation
of the cur-
rent figure
- the arm
(b) Detect and saccade
to the human
(c) Detect and sacade to
the hand
(d) Use the hand orien-
tation to select a por-
tion of the room
(e) Select the most
salient blob in the se-
lected area
(f) saccade to the blob
Figure 3-16: An example of pointing where the system
low bottom-up saliency.
finally saccades to an object with
finally saccaded to happens to be the most salient in the image, however as Figure 3-16
shows this need not be the case. Even though the bottom-up saliency of the calendar in
the left of the image is low compared to other parts of the image, the selected cone shaped
region can be viewed as imposing a top down modulating effect leading to the selection of
the calendar as the most salient location.
The previous example of a visual routine emphasizes the framework described in Figure 3-5.
The system repeatedly establishes a locus of attention, there it establishes some properties
with respect to the point of foveation, selecting from the range of values of these properties
enables the system to shift its focus of attention to some region of space where it may
monitor a particular event or feature. At another level, we saw that the system repeatedly
sets up successive frames of reference. For example it used the size and orientation of the
human to determine the size and locations at which to search for the hand.
3.8.2 Example 2
In this example I describe a simple visual routine for tracking a moving object even as it
passes behind an obstacle. Experiments with infants [3] show that 3 month old infants
already have strong expectations for such events, for instance that the object is likely
to emerge at the other end of the object, and are surprised when these expectations are
violated. One important and unanswered question is: what is the representation of these
expectations? One of the contributions of this thesis is the concrete proposal that the
representation of the expectation is in terms of changes of attentional state, where the
attentional state and the associated operations are as specified in the previous sections. In
other words, changes of attentional-state are sufficient to explain the behavior of the child
without invoking more abstract "beliefs" about objects or requiring any "intuitive physics".
Such abstract knowledge could arise later, but the point here is that it is not necessary to
explain the behavior of the child.
In the following example the visual routine is hand-sequenced. In the next chapter I show
how expectations can be learned in an unsupervised manner and thereafter generate visual
routines. For now however the point of this example is to show that
* The changes of state of the figure (the ball) and the local spatial context contain
sufficient information for constructing the visual routine that checks for the ball re-
emerging at the opposite edge.
* The set of operators described in previous sections (in particular the operator for
matching local-spatial context described in section 3.5.3) is capable of implementing
this visual routine.
In this example the task is to simply track the ball. Figure 3-17(a)shows a schematic of the
visual routine that tracks even in the presence of occlusion.
[Track Object Figure 3-17(b) and (c) shows a ball and the local context (shown as a large
red rectangle) around it as it is tracked. At every instant the figure (the ball), its attributes
(direction of motion, size, orientation) and the local context around it are being monitored.
Lose ball at the right edge The system waits until the tracker loses the ball (Figure
3-17(c)(e) and the local context matches the local context shown in (d), i.e. a dark edge to
the right of center.
Saccade to the right searching for the opposite edge : Once it loses the ball at
an edge, the system saccades to the right, while searching for a local context that matches
the one shown in (g).
Wait for motion : Having found the opposite edge the system maintains its focus of
attention on this edge while waiting for motion within the current local context (f). When
it finally sees motion here (h) it saccades to the moving object, and starts tracking it again
(i).
The example emphasizes how the kinds of information attended to in the local-context
changes during the course of the event. In frame (b) only the moving figure is being
attended to, in (c) (e) (f) (g) the spatial structure of the local context (in particular the
dark edge to the right, and the dark edge to the left) is relevant. In (h) only the motion
information within the local context is relevant.
3.9 Evaluation of the architecture
The previous sections showed some examples of visual routines implemented in terms of the
proposed language of attention. An empirical way of demonstrating the versatility of the
language is to implement hundreds of visual routines for everyday tasks. While extensive
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Figure 3-17: The system uses its expectation for a change of local context to look at the
appropriate location for the re-appearance of the ball after having lost it.
testing is certainly a high priority, there is another way of evaluating the language, without
trying to enumerate all the visual routines that one can write (which is an impossible task
for a compositional grammar). Visual routine primitives and the visual routines that they
produce (sequences of primitives) are at different levels of complexity, and therefore can be
evaluated independently (even though the routines are constructed from the primitives). In
other words, we can make some requirements of what visual routine primitives should do,
and similarly make some requirements of what visual routines should do and check to see
if these requirements are met.
How robust are the primitives at establishing spatial relationships between re-
gions? There are really two questions here. First, how does one characterize the spatial
relations between two regions? and secondly do the primitives I use capture these spatial
relations? An exhaustive way of characterizing the relative spatial relationship between
two regions (say A and B), is to make explicit the distance and direction distributions
of every point in one region (say A) with respect to every point in B. A little reflection
will show that any relative spatial relation (e.g. all patches in A which have a patch of
B immediately to the right and below) is easily computed from the distance and direction
distributions. I claim that the primitives in my system that capture local region relations
and global marker distributions capture the information in these distance and direction dis-
tributions. As mentioned in section 3.5.3 the local region relations capture the information
in the distributions when the regions are close together, and the global marker relations
between the region centroids capture the information in the (unimodal) distributions when
the regions are far apart. Hence the primitives completely characterize the spatial relations
between two regions.
How robust is the language at constructing visual routines to capture visuospa-
tial patterns of activity? The language that I have proposed is built around two insights
about what visual routines do:
1. Visual Routines establish successive local frames of reference. For example in the
pointing example the size and orientation of the human were used to setup a local
frame of reference, which was used to select expectations about the location of the
hand. Which in turn was was used a frame of reference to select a portion of the
room.
2. Visual Routines monitor changes in attentional state.
Given that the language I have proposed has been explicitly constructed with these two
functions of visual routines in mind, my language is effective in capturing visuospatial
patterns of activity insofar as visuospatial patterns of activity indeed perform the two
functions listed above.
I now look at the proposed language of attention in the light of existing models of visual
attention.
3.10 A review of models of Visual Attention
"Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind in
clear and vivid form of one out of what seem several simultaneous objects or
trains of thought." - William James (1907)
Hypotheses regarding the role of attention in visual processing have changed little since
William James' 1907 proposal. Attention is viewed primarily as a selection mechanism that
allows the visual system to allocate its limited resources to specific regions in an image
for further specialized processing. To achieve the goal of reducing or constraining overall
input to the cognizer, selective attention may filter out some features while enhancing our
perception of other features. The attentional system, in essence, is entrusted with the task
of controlling the information flow that incessantly impinges on an observer.
Over the past several decades, a host of researchers have elaborated this general theme.
In this section I review some of the empirical data and the most prominent proposals
regarding the role of attention. For more extensive descriptions, the reader can refer to any
of a number of other reviews (Posner [44]; Posner & Petersen [45] Posner & Rothbart [46];
Tomlin & Villa [55]).
The purpose of this review is to establish that the models of attention that have been
developed so far have adopted a rather narrow outlook as to the role of attention in visual
processing. This will serve to highlight one of the main points of this thesis, namely, that
attention is not merely a stand-alone selection process, but is instead a component of the
larger visual routines machinery.
3.10.1 Models of attention as a region/object selection mechanism
LaBerge[26] has been a strong proponent of the selectional role of attention. In his model,
attention is merely an enhancer of the attended area, and a suppressor of the surround.
The attentional machinery can achieve this contrastive effect in one of three ways:
1. Via a greater enhancement of the attended area than that of the surround, or
2. Via a lesser degradation of the attended region than that of the surround, or
3. Enhancement of the attended region and degradation of the surround. In LaBerge's
model, then, attention is what heightens our sensitivity to specific subsets of our
surroundings.
To ground out his model in actual brain structures, LaBerge proposes that attentional
processing is carried out by thalamocortical circuits - by the transfer of information to
and from the cortex from the thalamus. The thalamus serves to selectively amplify the
information coming into the visual system and this amplified information is fed back to the
system. The superior colliculus, he believes, plays a role in determining what location to
attend to.
A proposal that seeks to refine the general notion of attention as a selection mechanism
hypothesizes a role for attention in object selection. The basic idea is that attention fa-
cilitates individual object selection by binding multiple features to objects (Treisman and
Galade [14]) or by putting the features in the correct "object files" (Kahneman and Treis-
man, 1984). Treisman's feature integration theory assumes that the key to the process of
combining preattentive features into objects is focused attention. Such a process comes into
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Figure 3-18: A schematic depiction of Treisman's Feature Integration Theory. Treisman
views attention as the 'glue' that binds features to objects.
play in complex conjunction search situations, wherein the target object may be defined
as a conjunction of multiple attributes. The flow-chart in Figure 3-18 shows how focused
attention is involved in the overall process of object perception according to the Feature
Integration Theory.
3.10.2 Physiological evidence for a selectional role of attention
Researchers have found attentional modulation/selection of neuronal response in several
visual cortical areas. Results from area V4 are particularly striking (Moran and Desimone
[35]; Haenny, Maunsell and Schiller [18]; Haenny and Schiller [19]; Spitzer[54]). In some of
their early work, Moran and Desimone trained monkeys to attend to a colored bar shape
in one location and to ignore a different one in the other location. When both stimuli
were in the receptive field of a cell, the cell responded well if the stimulus to which the
cell was responsive appeared at the attended location but was attenuated significantly if
the stimulus appeared at the unattended location. In general, V4 single-cell data indicates
that cells exhibit a gain in firing rate when a single object is presented and attended to.
However, when two objects are presented and only one of them is attended, cells show no
change in firing rate if the stimulus is a target (preferred) and exhibit attenuation if the
stimulus is a distractor (non-preferred).
3.10.3 Psychophysical evidence for a selectional role of attention
Informal psychophysical evidence for a selectional role of attention comes from several ev-
eryday experiences. An example may be picking out a conversation at a party to listen to
or concentrating on one instrument, say the clarinet, during a musical performance. When
attention is directed to the desired voice or the chosen instrument, the key information
is more easily extracted from the environment, making it available for further processing-
pulling out the content of the conversation or determining the success of the clarinet player,
for instance. The facilitation of some information comes at the expense of the inhibition of
competing information. So, it is difficult to sustain a current conversation when a nearby
one is attended to, and it is hard to keep track of other players when the clarinet is selected
for listening.
There is also a host of formal experimental evidence that supports the selectional role of
attention. For instance, Burkell and Pylyshyn (1995) have built upon the work by Yantis
and Jonides (1984) (who demonstrated that sudden onsets attract "attention" or "priority
tags"). They have found that subjects can separate the subset of search items whose
locations are precued by a late-onset marker from the other tokens in a display. Treisman
and Sato (1990) have also found evidence for the selection role of attention
3.10.4 Current work in modeling attentional processes
A number of research teams are working towards modeling eye-movements and attentional
fixations. Prominent efforts in this regard include (Rao and Ballard, 1995; Rao et al.,
1996; Itti and Koch, 1996). The common underlying strategy in all these pieces of work is
the computation of saliency maps on some pre-specified image attributes such as color or
luminance contrast. Attentional fixations then wander from one image region to another
in the order of their computed saliency. Rao et al., 1996, for instance, build iconic scene
representations using oriented spatial filters at multiple scales. The attentional 'itenary' is
constructed in a coarse-to-fine fashion with higher salience being attached to larger scale
filter responses. Itti and Koch follow a similar strategy. They combine multi-scale image
features into a topographic saliency map. The relative weights of the image features can be
learned.
3.10.5 What's missing in all these models?
It is important to note that all these efforts are concerned only with the control strategy for
determining the loci of attention over time, but say nothing about the processing that hap-
pens at the attended locations. Going back to the Yarbus example in Figure 2-2(c) simply
selecting various parts of the scene does not accomplish the task at hand of estimating the
ages of the people, there is some crucial task-specific computation at each successive focus
of attention. The "attention = selection" view stems directly from viewing attention as an
independent selectional mechanism whose main function is to facilitate object-recognition.
In this thesis, I shall argue that this view-point needs to be expanded and that atten-
tion needs to be viewed as an integral component of the visual routines machinery, and
consequently any realistic model of attention must have a proposal for the vocabulary of
operations that can be performed at the focus of attention. In this more comprehensive
view, selection is just one facet of what attention does; a more important role it plays is
in the establishment/extraction of inter or intra region spatial properties. These properties
are critical for the performance of visual routines.
3.11 Summary
In this chapter I presented the architecture of a system for constructing visual routines,
and showed some examples of visual routines implemented in terms of this language. The
examples highlighted two ways of looking at what visual routines do: namely, establishing
successive changes of frames of reference, and monitoring changes in attentional state. The
proposed language of attention represents a significant step beyond prior models of Atten-
tion. Whereas prior models viewed the role of Attention as just "Selection", I emphasized
two other families of operations which are also crucial to a realistic model of Attention.
I also made some specific proposals about the operations that constitute each family of
operations. While the specific operations may change in the future as we better understand
visual routines, we claim that the families of operations and the types of the operations will
endure.
Chapter 4
Learning Visual Routines
In this chapter I present a scheme for learning visual routines from expe-
rience. Whereas in Chapter 3 the focus was on the primitive operations
of visual routines and how they can be strung together to extract differ-
ent spatial relations, the focus here is on how visual routines automatically
come about from experience. In this chapter I will provide an answer to the
following related questions:
1. If visual routines for extracting spatial relations are not explicitly se-
quenced or composed how do they come about?
2. Event expectations: By the age of six months infants already have
certain expectations about events in the world. Figure 4-2 shows an
example of an event that surprises 4!-month-old infants. How do
these expectations arise?
3. Event recognition: We use terms like "pick-up" or "collide" to describe
certain events even though the details of the individual instances may
differ widely in their details (Figure 4-1 shows two different instances
of "pickup"). What is invariant in different instances of pick-up or
collide that leads us to describe them the same way? And how do we
learn these invariants?
The answers to these questions will hinge on the following ideas: Visual
routines are learned - not planned. Event expectations can be formed by
learning frequently occuring patterns in attentional state. Extracting invari-
ances requires proactive exploration.
4.1 Visual routines are learned - not planned
In section 2.1.2 we saw that there were two important issues that any "basis-set" theory of
visuospatial problem solving must deal with: The choice of a basis set of primitive opera-
tions, and their composition. The previous chapter dealt with the first issue, it described a
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Figure 4-1: Two patterns of activity (a-c)
common? and how can we learn it?
and (d-f), that are similar in some way, what is
Figure 4-2: 41-month-old infants preferentially look longer at the "impossible event"in the
bottom row, presumably because some expectation was violated. What is the representation
of this expectation? and how was it acquired?.[31]
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Figure 4-3: Regularities in the world and attentional biases repeatedly drive the atten-
tional state through patterns. High frequency patterns become expectations. Expectations
generate visual routines to check for the predicted part of the pattern.
small family of operations (a kind of "language of visual attention") and showed examples
of how visual routines could be constructed by repeatedly choosing operations from the
family of operations. The visual routines in the examples however were composed by hand,
in this chapter we deal with the remaining important issue, namely how visual routines can
be automatically composed. How can a system know how to put together a visual rou-
tine to determine what a person is pointing at or if one object is touching another object?
This statement of the problem implies an "explicit sequencer", a box that when given a
new visuospatial problem, somehow "knows" how to sequence the primitive operations to
solve that problem. I take the position that there is no such box, no explicit sequencer for
constructing visual routines.
An overview of my approach
The following points list the main features of my approach, a schematic of which is shown
in Figure 4-3.
1. Patterns of visual activity emerge from interaction with the environment (as we saw
in section 2.4 in "Amazon" [10]). Exploration of the environment leaves a "trace"
in attentional state. Regularities in the world (recurring spatial relationships and
events) and biases in attention (the tendency to track moving objects for instance)
cause repeating trajectories in attentional state. The components of attentional state
are as described in section 3.7.
2. These emergent patterns in attentional state can be learned. The repeating "patterns
of activity" in one's attentional state can stand out simply because of the higher
frequency with which they occur.
3. A partial match of the current trajectory (shown in blue) with the learned prior
pattern leads to the prediction of the rest of the pattern (shown in red).
4. The predicted sequence of attentional states generate a corresponding "visual routine"
which is used to check for those states. The transformation of predicted states into
a routine is easy because as shown in Table 3.2 every property has a corresponding
operation to extract it.
5. Exploration must be pro-active. In order to learn certain abstract spatial invariants
(like pick-up) one must actively select regions and monitor properties to notice any
regularities.
In the following sections I first explain the motivation and issues surrounding each of these
points before delving into the specific instantiation in my system.
I first clarify what I mean by the first point.
4.2 Situated patterns of activity, and interactive emergence
In his book Catching Ourselves in the Act Horst Hendriks-Jansen [20] examines the role
of natural selection in the explanation of human behavior and the nature of explanatory
models of human intelligence. His main message is that patterns of emergent activity are
the only basis for an explanation of natural intelligence. A brief discussion of his work will
shed light on the idea of "patterns of activity" which as we have seen is a useful way of
thinking about visual routines.
Jansen does a thorough job of analyzing the implicit assumptions that underlie various com-
putational theories/explanations/recipes for human-like intelligence including the symbol-
systems approach, connectionism, and behavior-based A.I. While this is not the place to
detail Jansen's numerous well-crafted arguments, there is one point that recurs in his criti-
cism of existing explanations of intelligence:
Deliberately designed computational models do not have explanatory power because they
they do not reveal anything more about the-thing-being-modeled beyond what was put in.
He says (of the deliberately designed models):
They require clearly defined parameters that delineate the similarities between
the model and the explicandum right from the start. The model does not help
to define the parameters, and it has no power to reveal previously unsuspected
causal and structural relations. These need to have been defined before the
model is ever built, since it is built in terms of those parameters in an attempt
to prove that certain formally specified relations exist in the explicandum just
as they do in the model.
Jansen concludes that the "natural" kinds for explaining intelligence must therefore come
from some other place than the model itself. He suggests that the patterns of activity that
a system exhibits when it interacts with the environment are a good candidate for these
"natural kinds". An example of such a pattern of activity is the wall-following behavior
that a robot exhibits when its low level reflexes of Avoiding obstacles, Aligning to some
direction, Strolling, and Correcting (see [31] for the details) interact with an environment
that happens to have walls. the important point that Jansen makes is that the "wall-
following" activity is not a predetermined series of movements, it emerges from both, the
presence of the wall and the low-level reflexes, and has a structure that lies above the reflexes
that produce it. Furthermore, the notion of a wall does not have an internal representation
inside the robot, and no formal description of the wall is necessary to produce the activity.
What do visual routines have to do with all this?
A lot. The concept of frequently occurring traces in attentional state is identical to Jansen's
"patterns of activity" (in fact I use the same phrase). I feel that I have built upon Jansen's
notion of patterns of activity in one important way. Jansen would like find out what the
natural kinds are for humans and how these "natural kinds" arose via natural selection. To
him that would constitute a valid explanation of intelligence. My goal is to use the natural
kinds to construct intelligence. I would like to suggest that one could build a system that can
notice and grasp the patterns of activity that it goes through, and use them as a vocabulary
or scaffolding for higher-level cognition.
4.3 Why learn emergent patterns?
We now move on to the second point mentioned in the outline of section 4.1, namely that
the emergent patterns of visual activity are learned. A reasonable question here is "If visual
routines emerge from interactions with the environment, why bother learning them?" After
all, won't they just happen automatically when needed? It is important to understand why
this argument is flawed.
4.3.1 Visuospatial patterns lead to expectations that impose top-down
bias on behavior
Suppose someone is trying to get a child to look at some object in the environment. In
some situations, pointing at it works because the object is very salient to begin with, and
the child's attention shifts from your hand (or gaze direction) to the object purely due to
bottom-up biases (i.e. without using the direction of the hand as a cue). However, there
will be other situations where the object is not very salient, and having learned the relation
between hand orientation and object position from prior situations makes all the difference
in being able to locate the object. In fact these are the situations where the pointing
gesture really has function. Putting it another way, learning the correlation when the signal
is "strong" helps you in situations when there is noise and the signal is weak, because now
you have a model. Another example is the visual routine that you go through of looking
both ways before crossing the road. Sometimes you may be driven through this routine by
a bottom-up behavior of looking at a looming stimulus in the periphery. Noticing that this
pattern happens a lot on roads, remembering the pattern, making it an expectation, and
pro-actively looking left and right before you cross a road, has clear survival value. The
bottom-up behavior is still in effect, but it may be too late by the time it is triggered, or
it may not be triggered at all if portions of the road are not in your peripheral vision (e.g.
you're at an intersection).
The reason for learning emergent patterns discussed above is essentially arguing for the
benefit of having expectations, in that expectations about your interaction with the world
constitute a kind of model of the world, which can drive behavior in a top-down manner
to pro-actively extract signal from noise. There is another different but equally important
reason for learning emergent patterns in experience: patterns in visual experience form the
basis for "higher-level" concepts that can be used for communication between agents that
share the same set of patterns by virtue of having the same or very similar visual routine
architecture.
4.3.2 Visuospatial patterns form the basis of language, and reasoning
Consider the following significant aspects of human cognitive development:
1. Children learn regularities in the environment well before they can speak, [52] [3].
2. Children are rarely supervised in their learning of visuospatial concepts.
3. When they are supervised, for example when an adult describes something that's hap-
pening (e.g. "look at that ball falling"), children learn the concept with surprisingly
few examples, compared to the large number of examples that current supervised
learning programs need.
4. Children make systematic errors in reasoning that indicate a visuospatial basis for
concepts and reasoning. In one experiment a child's concept of "more" is tested. The
child thinks that there is "more" water in a tall narrow glass than when the same
water is poured into a short broad glass. The conservation experiment is one of many
experiments which indicate that initially "abstract" concepts and reasoning have a
strong perceptual bias.
In the light of such facts, I would like to suggest that:
1. A vast number of visuospatial patterns are extracted at a very early stage in child
development in an unsupervised manner.
2. Subsequent supervised learning only requires a few examples because the child almost
has the concepts, and the supervised learning is simply helping label a pattern that
has already been learned.
3. The visuospatial patterns are required for language development, and must necessarily
be acquired before spatial words can be learned.
4. The visuospatial patterns are used for higher cognitive functions( like reasoning about
quantity).
In the next few sections I describe the details of the instantiation of the approach described
in 4.1 in my system, and show the visual routines generated as a result of exploration and
learning.
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Figure 4-4: Biases about where to look and what to do at the focus of attention are necessary
for exploration.
4.4 Attentional traces during exploration
In the examples of the previous chapter the hand-coded visual routine, together with
the scene, decided where the system looked, and what properties got monitored across
foveations. During free exploration however, i.e. when the system is not trying to solve any
particular problem, it must have biases about where to look next, and what to do at the
focus of attention.
A system of simple behaviors shown in Figure 4-4(a) implements bottom-up biases about
where to look. One behavior tracks moving blobs, another one looks at the largest moving
blob. A third behavior looks at color-salient objects if nothing is moving. At present the
behaviors have been individually tested but the subsumption structure (indicated by the
dashed lines in the figure) has not.
Apart from where to look, there must also be biases about what to do at the focus of at-
tention, and what state to maintain across foveations, during free exploration. Throughout
the thesis I have emphasized that any realistic model of attention must take into account
what happens at the focus of attention. A large part of the previous chapter was devoted to
a description of the properties and operations at the focus of attention. These operations
could be used to establish different kinds of spatial properties at the FOA depending on
the task at hand. However, what does one do during exploration? There are a couple of
possibilities:
* One possibility is to always extract certain properties. For instance the figure at-
tributes, and the local spatial context around the figure may be important properties
to extract and monitor across foveations regardless of the situation.
* Another possibility (not mutually exclusive) is to have other representational systems
and motivations suggest tasks. What does this mean? So far I have only talked about
the visuospatial machinery for a humanoid robot, but clearly the visuospatial machin-
ery doesn't exist in isolation, but is a vehicle for a variety of goals and motivations
that need to check for certain situations in the environment. To take just one ex-
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Figure 4-5: The attentional trace for an event generated by the bottom-up exploratory
behaviors of Figure 4-4. Only the tracking behavior was active
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ample; A drive to look for people, and check to see who is next to whom may be a
high priority to parts of the brain concerned with social interaction, so there may be
a strong bias to put markers on people (as opposed to other objects) and monitor the
relative spatial positions of these markers during exploration of a scene.
Given that I have been considering the visuospatial machinery in isolation, and because I
want to start with a simple scheme, I've adopted the first option, of always monitoring a
fixed set of features (listed below). Furthermore in all of the examples in this chapter I have
used a blue ball as the object of interest, so as not to mix in the issue of object recognition
and obscure what I am trying to show, namely that it is possible to learn visuospatial
patterns of activity using the local and spatial representations described in the previous
chapter.
Summarizing the conditions under which the learning experiments were conducted: A blue
ball was used, and this fact was used to aid in the tracking. During tracking the properties
monitored (the attentional state) was restricted to the following components:
1. The direction of motion of the figure.
2. The presence or absence of the figure (i.e. is the size of the figure non-zero)
3. The immediate spatial context around the figure.
In other words I will not for the moment consider the other components of attentional state
described in 3.7.
Figure 4-5(a) shows some snapshots of the ball being automatically tracked as it is pushed
over the edge of the table. The local context around the ball (shown as a large red square)
is scaled to a fixed size of 40x40. Figure 4-5(b) shows the full trace of the local context,
from left to right in row major order, the ball is pushed, it rolls to the edge of the white
table, falls over and bounces. Note that the direction of motion of the figure, and presence
or absence of the figure is also part of the state but has not been shown in Figure 4-5.
4.5 Activating similar attentional traces in memory
Multiple instances of events involving the ball that may be described as "falling", "collid-
ing", "bouncing", "passing-behind", and "picking-up" were recorded. Attentional traces
for each of these events were stored as in memory, forming different trajectories in the at-
tentional state space. Trajectories of "similar" events should be close together in the state
space.
As it is hard to depict the entire state space and highlight the trajectories that cluster
together (as shown in the schematic of Figure 4-3), I will adopt another way of showing
the same information. I will match a segment of an attentional trace to all segments
of attentional traces of all examples, and display the best matches. If the choice of the
attentional state space has been a judicious one, then we should expect to see segments of
attentional traces of "similar" events.
For now I use a very simple-minded method for matching trajectories; I match trajectories
based solely on the absolute values of the figure attributes, (i.e. the direction of motion of
Figure 4-6: The top row is the query segment of a "falling" ball, the next 10 rows show the
10 closest trajectories to the query trajectory in attentional state space.
the ball, and whether it was being tracked or not). This can be thought of as moving a little
sphere along a trajectory in state space, and considering only trajectories that fall within
the volume swept out in state space. It would be more reasonable to match differences in
attentional state, which would be much more robust. However, this is only a first pass at
demonstrating the approach described in 4.1 and should not be taken as representative of
the full capabilities of the system.
Figure 4-6, shows the 10 closest trajectories in the attentional state space to segments of
a ball "falling to the right". The topmost row shows the new or query sequence, the next
10 rows show the closest trajectories. Time goes from left to right. Some of the matching
trajectories are almost identical to other ones except shifted in time.
Figure 4-7, and Figure 4-8 show the 10 retrieved best trajectories for queries of a ball
"bouncing", and "passing behind" an occluder.
Figure 4-7: The top row is the query segment of a "bouncing" ball, the next 10 rows show
the 10 closest trajectories to the query trajectory in attentional state space.
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Figure 4-8: The top row is the query segment of a ball "passing behind" an occluder, the
next 10 rows show the 10 closest trajectories to the query trajectory in attentional state
space. There was really only one other example in experience that was similar.
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(a) The averaged ratio templates of activated traces of Figure 4-6
(b) A visualization of the averaged ratio templates
Figure 4-9: The top row shows the learned local spatial context for an object falling to the
right. The bottom row shows a visualization of the template. Time goes from left to right
in these sequences.
4.6 Learning an expectation from activated attentional traces
Having activated/retrieved "similar" attentional traces, the recurring pattern is learned by
simply averaging the local spatial contexts of the activated traces. For example, in Figure
4-6 the local context ratio-templates for the 10 traces are averaged to get an "expectation
or template for falling to the right" as shown in Figure 4-9(a).
4.7 Learning visual routines via reinforcement learning
In this section I review an alternative approach for learning visual routines and compare it
to the approach described in this chapter.
4.7.1 An overview of the U-tree reinforcement learning algorithm
McCallum [32] describes a U-Tree reinforcement algorithm for learning visual routines.
Visual routines are viewed as a sequence of perceptual actions to redirect the purposefully
narrow attention window to relevant parts of the environment. The agent's task at every
step is to choose where to look, where to focus covert attention, and which perceptual
computations to perform on the available sensory data. McCallum concludes that learning
a strategy for perceptual actions is an integral part of learning to perform the task. He
then points out that Reinforcement Learning is well suited for learning of attentional shifts
because Reinforcement Learning's chief strength lies in its ability to choose sequences of
actions based on the current state and some policy or reward function. The problem of
hidden state (due to a limited attentional window) is addressed by having some short-term
memory for states and actions in the immediate past.
McCallum presents a new reinforcement learning algorithm called U- Tree. The input to the
algorithm at each time step is a transition triplet of action-just-taken, current-state, reward.
From this time series of triplets the algorithm constructs a decision-tree which takes a new
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Figure 4-10: A schematic of a U-tree decision tree for organizing attentional state space.
From McCallum[32]
triplet and classifies it in a bin. Figure 4-10 shows a schematic of a U-tree along with a
sequence of instances at the bottom. In this U-tree there are two possible actions, -uI, and
[I, which appear at the leaves of the tree along with an estimated utility Q-value (not
shown in the figure). There are three input dimensions which take on values (A, B, C), (,
#, $), and (+, -) respectively. The branches of the U-tree indicate a classification decision
based on perceptual state in the recent past (e.g. 1C asks if the state C was observed 1
time-step ago). Given some new observation like (B $ -) which was reached after taking
the action [-u , the observation is classified by following the branches of the tree from the
root: 0$ because we are seeing $ now, then lu because the last action taken was -, then
1C because C was observed in the previous instance. This leads to a leaf which suggests
that the next action taken be V along with the expected utility of this action.
The U-tree is constructed by starting with one node, and then dividing up the instances
classified by that node into separate nodes under it. The partitioning is done based on
testing the instances for statistically significant differences based on expected future dis-
counted reward. The statistical test applied to check if the instances came from different
distributions is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
McCallum tests the system on a simulation of highway driving. Seven perceptual dimensions
(e.g. hear-horn, gaze-object, gaze-side, gaze-speed, e.t.c.) each with a discrete set of values
are available to the system. The system also receives one of three rewards at each time step:
-10.0 for scraping past a slow truck, -1.0 when a fast truck honks at the agent, and 0.1 for
making progress. Given a seven dimensional input and a reward, the agent must choose one
of five actions: gaze-forward-left, gaze-forward-center, gaze-forward-right, gaze-backward,
and shift-to-gaze-lane. The result of using the U-tree approach is that the system creates
only 143 internal tree nodes, out of a possible state space of 25003.
4.7.2 A critique of Reinforcement Learning
The criticism that follows is not directed particularly at the U-tree method but at the
reinforcement learning framework in general. There is clearly a difference in paradigm
between the reinforcement learning approach described above and my approach to learning
as described in section 4.1. The following are some of the major differences:
Representation is key, abstracting away from it is bad. In any learning approach
there are three questions of paramount importance, what is being learned? In what repre-
sentation is it being learned? and How is it being learned? i.e. what is the learning method
being used? Once we have decided what it is that we want to learn, picking a representation
is key, because picking a good representation that makes important things explicit greatly
simplifies the learning method used. This is the route that I have chosen. In chapter 3 I have
spent some effort in choosing a simple but rich set of properties and operations, so that
when it comes to picking a learning method I can use a relatively simple memory-based
method of noticing high-frequency patterns. Reinforcement Learning on the other hand
abstracts away from the representation and places its emphasis on a complicated learning
method that requires a reward at every step. Delayed reward methods exist, but are even
more complicated because they have to deal with severe credit assignment issues. Notice
that in the highway driving problem above, once the problem was formulated in terms of
7 perpetual dimensions, 3 rewards, and 5 actions, as far as the learning method was con-
cerned it could well have been about trading options in the stock market. The learning
method doesn't care where the problem came from, in fact this is viewed as a "strength"
of Reinforcement Learning, and makes it seductive because it can be used in any domain.
However, this "generality" comes at a very costly price. The learning method now has to
do significantly more work and introduce artificial constructs like "reward" to unreath the
regularity from the data. There is a strong parallel here between the use of Reinforcement
Learning like methods and the promotion of "Search in some space of symbols" as a "gen-
eral" problem solving method in the early days of A.I. because both approaches abstract
away from the representation, the choice of which is the crucial part of the problem.
Notice structure in the world, don't look for a reward at every step. My approach
depends crucially on the fact that there is structure in the world which interacts with the
biases of the system to produce repeating patterns in attentional state. It is artificial to
posit rewards for every time step of every event, firstly because it begs the question of who
is going to come up with a reward structure for every task, but more importantly because
in many situations like observing a ball falling, rewards just don't make sense. Events just
happen. Being able to notice recurring ones, and predict their occurrence is reward in itself.
I am not claiming that rewards have no place at all in learning. In supervised learning, a
gesture of appreciation to a child, or a tidbit of food to a dog, could help reinforce some
behavior. However in most situations adopting a "reinforcement with reward" framework
is not necessary to learn.
Low-level exploratory behaviors incorporate implicit biases, making explicit
rewards unnecessary. Low-level exploratory behaviors like "tracking", or "look-for-
human", implicitly encode biases about what to do next; the tracking behavior is "rewarded"
by continued tracking, and the "look-for-human" by finding a human to look at every time
step. Therefore they already incorporate very specific notions of reward particular to their
goals and do not need explicit and arbitrary measures of reward. Reinforcement Learning
on the other hand by abstracting away from the problem, has no biases about what to do
and has the full panoply of action choices available at every time step. This lack of bias
will be claimed as a virtue because it makes the system more "general", however as biology
shows again and again, presence of biases in low-level behaviors speeds up learning and
leads to the interactive emergence of patterns of activity [20].
4.8 The role of visual routines in cognitive development
In this section I will review some past and recent work on child development, and examine
the exciting implications of visual routines on cognitive development.
4.8.1 A brief overview of Piaget's theory
Any discussion of child development must begin with a summary of Jean Piaget's monu-
mental contributions. The following are the four stages of development as hypothesized by
Piaget:
1. Sensorimotor Stage[0-2yrs]: In this stage sensorimotor schemas of increasing complex-
ity are learned. The world is explored through some very basic reflexes like grasping,
or sucking. At first these reflexes work independently, but soon they start chaining
together into more complex sequences. Behaviors start distinguishing between stimuli
and are subject to reinforcement. The child repeats actions until he/she can repro-
duce them reliably. Exploration becomes more goal-directed as the child tries to do
things to repeat an interesting stimulus. Finally the child moves from sensorimotor
to representational intelligence as action sequences are simulated in the head rather
than by active manipulation (there is evidence that such simulations are possible in
certain motor and visual areas [15] of the brain). The defining feature of this stage is
that the child's concept of the world is completely in terms of its actions upon it.
2. Pre-operational stage [2-7yrs]: The child represent objects and events even in their
absence. Deferred imitation, symbolic play, drawing, and spoken language mature
during this stage. However, Preoperational thought is still strongly tied to perception.
It is egocentric and cannot grasp conservation laws.
3. Concrete operational stage [7-11yrs]: Logical thought is applied to concrete problems.
Thought finally breaks through from perceptual limitations that characterized the
previous two stages, and can now manipulate classes and relations leading to what
Piaget calls "mobility" of thinking.
4. Formal operational stage [11-15yrs]: Piaget believes that logic is the mirror of thought,
rather than the other way around, i.e. the function of formal logic is to make explicit
the mental operations that occur at the highest stage of human cognitive development
[24]. At this stage the adolescent can see abstract structure in discourse, metaphors,
and analogies of all kinds.
What aspects of Piaget's [41] theory are relevant to our efforts to build a humanoid-robot?
There are three aspects of Piaget's theory that stand out in this regard:
* Development = change of cognitive structures: cognitive and intellectual change
is the result of a development process. Cognitive development is a coherent process
of successive qualitative changes of "cognitive structures".
* Active exploration and construction. Development of cognitive structures is
ensured only with active exploration of the environment and social interaction. All
knowledge is a construction resulting from the child's actions. Physical knowledge is
constructed through discovery, whereas logical-mathematical has to be invented.
* Bootstrapping and Subsumption: The stages do not em replace each other in a
sequence, but are layered so that the later stages grows out of and modifies the actions
of the previous ones.
Paiget's main contribution is in the cataloging of the changes of behavior due to cognitive
development. Two big issues that still remain unanswered and are particularly relevant to
someone trying to build human-like intelligence are:
1. What develops? What exactly are the cognitive structures that undergo qualitative
changes?
2. How? What are the mechanisms that bring about the changes?
Piaget's suggests schemas as cognitive structures, and assimilation, and accommodation
as mechanisms of specialization and generalization of schemas. Piaget's schemas (as in-
terpreted by Drescher [11]) are essentially state action state triplets, that denote a state
transition caused by some action. While Piaget's suggestion of a schemas and assimilation
and accommodation mechanisms is a useful beginning, much remains to be done in finding
specific instantiations in terms of brain structures.
I will return to the two issues mentioned above after reviewing some work on cognitive
development that is more recent. One of the most actively researched and debated issues
in cognitive science relates to the somewhat vague notion of object concepts. Specifically,
what kinds of object concepts exist in the brain and how they develop from infancy through
adulthood. Many studies in developmental psychology have attempted to probe these ques-
tions. I review some of the key ones with a view to pointing out a major deficiency that
they all share - a lack of grounding of the cognitive notions into well-defined perceptual
primitives and operations. In fact, I will suggest that the perceptual grounding may, at
least in some cases, obviate the need to posit the existence of ill-defined high-level object
concepts in the developing or adult brain.
4.8.2 Perceptual grounding of object concepts
Spelke and her colleagues have been very active in trying to understand the course of
development of object concepts and physical knowledge [52, 53]. The major themes they
have identified in their empirical results are:
* The cognitive capacities for object perception in adults trace their roots back to early
infancy. Infants seem capable of perceiving, reasoning about and acting upon objects
in a relatively sophisticated manner.
* The capacities to perceive and reason about objects are closely related to one another.
* Infant's perception of objects is based upon fundamental physical constraints set down
in the environment, such as empirical cohesion within boundaries, continuity of mo-
tion paths and inter-object contacts. Since it intuitively seems that the principles of
cohesion, continuity and contact are critical to adult's conceptions of objects, a corol-
lary of Spelke et al's suggestion is that high-level object concepts come into being
relatively soon after birth in human infants (point 1, above).
In short, the developing brain is believed to embody knowledge about physical principles
in the environment. These principles guide object perception and reasoning. Furthermore,
since these principles are rather complex, (for instance, the relations of connectedness are
believed to operate on the underlying three-dimensional structure of the world, rather than
on two-dimensional image information), the object concepts they support are quite sophis-
ticated. Accordingly, the object perception processes are believed to occur late in the visual
system.
Another prominent group that has sought to investigate physical reasoning and object per-
ception in infancy comprises Baillargeon and her colleagues. Baillargeon took as her starting
point Piaget's [1952, 1954] suggestion that the notion of object permanence during occlusion
does not develop until nearly the "advanced" age of nine months. In his experiments with
infants younger than 9 months, Piaget repeatedly observed that children did not search for
objects that they had observed being hidden. Apparently, Piaget reasoned, the children in-
correctly assume that the objects cease to exist when concealed by other objects. However,
Baillargeon and others realized that infants might perform poorly on search tasks simply
because of difficulties inherent in planning a means-end search sequence rather than due
to incorrect beliefs about occlusion events. Using the violation-of-expectation experimental
paradigm (which exploits infant's tendency to look longer at novel than at familiar stim-
uli [Banks, 1983; Olson and Sherman, 1983; Spelke, 1985]), Baillargeon demonstrated in a
series of studies that contrary to traditional claims, even very young infants "appreciate"
that objects continue to exist when occluded. For instance, the infants expressed surprise
when a tall object seemingly disappeared while traveling behind a squat occluder but not
when the object was shorter than the occluder's height. The lack of surprise in the latter
case led Baillargeon to conclude that infants believe that objects continue to exist when
masked by other sufficiently large objects. Baillargeon's other studies have sought to probe
infants knowledge of contact relations as determinants of object stability and their ability
to reason about collision phenomena. In the former, the investigators presented evidence
to support the conclusion that infants acquire the abstract concept of support rapidly and
then progressively refine it over time (to be able to determine how much support is required
for stability). The latter set of experiments effectively tested for the presence of the notion
of conservation of momentum in young infants. Children were surprised upon seeing an
object that had just suffered a collision with a moving object stay stationary. The con-
clusion reached here was that children rapidly acquired the basic notion of conservation of
momentum and then refined it (how far should an object move after collision) gradually.
The empirical studies have made significant contributions to our understanding of the per-
ceptual capabilities of infants. However, important open questions remain regarding what
conclusions can legitimately be drawn from these experimental results. For instance, is it
valid to conclude on the basis of this data that infants do indeed possess a high-level object
concept? Stated differently, is a high-level object- concept critical to explaining these re-
sults? Also, does it suffice to label the infants knowledge as an object concept or a belief in
some physical law? Is it not important to ground out this somewhat vague cognitive notion
in actual computable perceptual primitives and operations?
In this thesis I have proposed a perceptually grounded representation for physical knowledge
about events in terms of changes of attentional state. In comparison to the works discussed
above I would like to emphasize the relative merits of my proposal:
1. A perceptually based representation that implicitly incorporates the observed physical
contingencies, is inherently simpler than an ill-defined high-level construct. Occam's
razor suggests that the former should be the preferred way of accounting for exper-
imental data. Also, by obviating the need to posit high-level object concepts, my
scheme becomes a viable candidate for explaining "object knowledge" in simpler ani-
mals as well.
2. A scheme that embodies a suggestion for how it may be implemented in a real system
is to be preferred over one that is mentalistic and vague.
3. My scheme allows for a uniform explanation of all experimental settings rather than
having to account for each data set by positing knowledge of a different physical law.
4. Perhaps the most important motivator for my perceptually based scheme is that it
relies solely on the observed contingencies rather than on any pre-ordained physical
laws. Experiments have proven over and over again that physics does not govern
perception, the statistics of the environment do.
4.9 Summary
This chapter focuses on the question of how visual routines can be learned. The key idea is
that repeating patterns in attentional state can be learned. Subsequently these learned ex-
pectations generate visual routines to check for the corresponding event. The results shown
were for only a small subset of the attentional state. More work needs to be done to show
learning in the full state space. This paradigm differs significantly from the reinforcement
learning paradigms currently being used. The representation of the learned patterns as
changes of attentional state has exciting implications for the perceptual grounding problem
as well as for theories of cognitive development in children.
Chapter 5
Contributions
Chapter Outline
This final chapter reviews the goals of the thesis. It states what was done,
and describes what remains to be done.
5.1 The two motivating problems
I set out to solve two problems:
1. To find a robust, versatile spatial analysis machinery that can be used to solve a wide
variety of spatial tasks.
2. To learn visuospatial concepts like fall or more, in an unsupervised manner.
The main motivation for the first problem is that a versatile spatial analysis machinery
is necessary not only to deal with a variety of perceptual tasks from moment to moment,
but the same machinery may also be re-used for spatial inference on synthesized/imagined
representations.
The motivation for the second problem is that there must be some notion of fall before the
system can check if an object is falling. I believe that such visuosaptial concepts are learned
from experience in an unsupervised manner.
5.2 Contributions of the thesis
My main contributions towards the first problem are:
* Asserting that a single versatile mechanism for visuospatial analysis is necessary to
build vision system with human level capabilities. An application-oriented approach of
having a collection of disparate programs for extracting various spatial relations will
not suffice.
Proposing a language of attention. I reviewed the visual routines proposal of Ullman
and the related work that has been done since, and took up the two key challenges that
any visual routine theory must address: developing a compact and expressive basis
set of primitive operations, and developing an automatic means of combining them
for a spatial task. I observed that any theory of visuospatial analysis is intimately
related to a theory of visual attention. I proposed a basis set of primitives categorized
into three families of operations. These families of operations constitute a language
of attention in the sense that a visual routine is constructed by stringing together
primitives from each class of operations. The word em language is used because the
model is generative in the same way that one generates sentences of a language by
stringing together elements of syntactic categories. The only difference is that the
sentences in the language of attention are procedures for extracting spatial relations.
How should you evaluate my proposal? The primary requirement of any visual routine
proposal is that it be very robust at handling a wide variety of spatial tasks. The most
convincing way to show that a proposal meets these requirements is by demonstrating that
it can handle hundreds of real world spatial problems. While this acid test has yet to be
conducted, I argue that the system can be evaluated on the basis of the degree to which
it does what visual routines are supposed to do. Namely, visual routines are supposed
to establish spatial relations between regions (at the focus of attention), and at a higher
level (across several shifts of the focus attention) exploit local structure in the world, by
setting up successive local frames of reference. I showed that the primitives of the system
were explicitly designed to establish local and global spatial relationships between regions,
thereby completely characterizing the spatial relations between regions. Moreover at a
higher level, I showed that the system does establish successive local frames of reference,
as demonstrated in the pointing example where the system uses the local context of the
human to find the hand, and then uses the local reference frame on the hand to select a
portion of the room.
The proposed model of attention goes beyond prior models of attention which viewed the
role of Attention as mere selection. While selection is a crucial function of attention, there
are other crucial issues (like the task-specific computations that are carried out at the focus
of attention) that must be accounted for by any realistic model of attention. My model is
a more comprehensive model of visual attention with selection taking its place as one of
several families of operations that work together in the solution of some spatial problem.
If visual routines are to be truly useful they should be automatically composed by the
system, not handcoded by a user. My main contributions with regard to the composition
issue are
* Visual routines are learned and not planned (this idea builds on Chapman's insight
that visual routines emerge from interaction with the world). My approach is to notice
recurring patterns of activity in attentional state, learn those patterns, and use them
as expectations to generate visual routines. I showed some examples demsontrating
the learning of trajectories in attentional state, but much work remains to be done
(see the following section).
* The perceptual representation of visuospatial concepts is in terms of changes of atten-
tional state. In other words I am suggesting a concrete represenation for perceptual
grouding. This has important implications on theories of cognitive development. It
makes the theories simpler and more concrete by explaining infant behavior in terms
of perceptual representations rather than in terms of "object-concepts" or "intuitive
physics".
5.3 Key issues of the future
In this thesis I proposed and demsonstrated the feasability of some new ideas for the synthe-
sis and learning of visual routines. However, it is necessary to go beyond a demonstration
of feasability and extensively test the proposed language of attention and learning scheme,
on a real-time head-eye platform. There is still considerable work to be done to make this
happen, however the prospect of having a system that learns thousands of visuospatial
concepts/patterns-of-activty and uses them as a scaffolding for communication and reason-
ing, is exciting and much closer than before.
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